Saturday, 31 May 2014

Mobile Phones: How To Trace A Mobile Number?

How To Trace A Mobile Number?

Are you sick and tired or getting missed calls from an unknown number? Do you tend to get all the information belongs to that ‘very’ number which is not only disturbing but also spooky at time? Don’t worry, now with the help of extensive technological growth all over the world, mobile number trackerbecomes an easy source of solution.

It is a doubtless solution for recognizing the offender. With the help of few ‘quick to do’ steps, one can easily get to the ultimatum. You don’t have to be the son of Homes (excuse the pun) but need to check the first 4 to 5 digits which generally stands for the telecom service providers. But at the same time you need to be an Einstein to know all the service providers which no man on Earth can think of. So you are stuck, the answer is no!! You just need to go for the web engines (Google, Yahoo and Bing) which will search for you in seconds.
The hunt would easily speak about the number along with its location. Many a times it is seen that the number is registered in the name of a company where the offender belongs, gives the address of the buyer or the company name.
Social media searches will also aid you in going for a right guess! This will add some fuel in your mission. But all of a sudden the search finishes when the entire exploring ends in some mere suspicion here you can go website which have the options of mobile location finder.
From these kinds of tacking sites you can easily end up with a good result. In fact here you can trace mobile number location with all the necessary details. When you navigate the pages of these kinds of tracing sites, you may come across various options like mobile location findervehicle number registration searchvehicle location Tracker, land line tracer and many more. By putting the number in the search box you can find the telecom service provider address, signalling and connection. This information can be of great usage. In fact would assist you in detecting the location from where the calls are being made.
But if you want to put a complaint or take some legal steps against some criminal activities then police intervention is very necessary. Still these tracing sites can easily complete your very first step of investigation!
So, best of luck and happy tracing ahead!! Read related articles on vehicle tracking system in India!
The post How To Trace A Mobile Number? appeared first on All India News.


Thursday, 29 May 2014

Snowden documents:Classified 2013 Covert Mission Intelligence Reports:Caribbean, Mexico, Kenya,Philippines .

The National Security Agency is secretly intercepting, recording, and archiving the audio of virtually every cell phone conversation Kenya, Caribbean, Mexico,Philippines and other unnamed counties.
According to documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, the surveillance is part of a top-secret system – code-named SOMALGET – that was implemented without the knowledge or consent of the Bahamian government. Instead, the agency appears to have used access legally obtained in cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration to open a backdoor to the country’s cellular telephone network, enabling it to covertly record and store the “full-take audio” of every mobile call made to, from and within the Bahamas – and to replay those calls for up to a month.
SOMALGET is part of a broader NSA program called MYSTIC, which The Intercept has learned is being used to secretly monitor the telecommunications systems of the Bahamas and several other countries, including Mexico, the Philippines, and Kenya. But while MYSTIC scrapes mobile networks for so-called “metadata” – information that reveals the time, source, and destination of calls – SOMALGET is a cutting-edge tool that enables the NSA to vacuum up and store the actual content of every conversation in an entire country.
All told, the NSA is using MYSTIC to gather personal data on mobile calls placed in countries with a combined population of more than 250 million people. And according to classified documents, the agency is seeking funding to export the sweeping surveillance capability elsewhere.
The program raises profound questions about the nature and extent of American surveillance abroad. The U.S. intelligence community routinely justifies its massive spying efforts by citing the threats to national security posed by global terrorism and unpredictable rival nations like Russia and Iran. But the NSA documents indicate that SOMALGET has been deployed in the Bahamas to locate “international narcotics traffickers and special-interest alien smugglers” – traditional law-enforcement concerns, but a far cry from derailing terror plots or intercepting weapons of mass destruction.
“The Bahamas is a stable democracy that shares democratic principles, personal freedoms, and rule of law with the United States,” the State Department concluded in a crime and safety report published last year. “There is little to no threat facing Americans from domestic (Bahamian) terrorism, war, or civil unrest.”
By targeting the Bahamas’ entire mobile network, the NSA is intentionally collecting and retaining intelligence on millions of people who have not been accused of any crime or terrorist activity. Nearly five million Americans visit the country each year, and many prominent U.S. citizens keep homes there, including Sen. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), Bill Gates, and Oprah Winfrey.
In addition, the program is a serious – and perhaps illegal – abuse of the access to international phone networks that other countries willingly grant the United States for legitimate law-enforcement surveillance. If the NSA is using the Drug Enforcement Administration’s relationship to the Bahamas as a cover for secretly recording the entire country’s mobile phone calls, it could imperil the longstanding tradition of international law enforcement cooperation that the United States enjoys with its allies.
“It’s surprising, the short-sightedness of the government,” says Michael German, a fellow at New York University’s Brennan Center for Justice who spent 16 years as an FBI agent conducting undercover investigations. “That they couldn’t see how exploiting a lawful mechanism to such a degree that you might lose that justifiable access – that’s where the intelligence community is acting in a way that harms its long-term interests, and clearly the long-term national security interests of the United States.”
The NSA refused to comment on the program, but said in a statement that “the implication that NSA’s foreign intelligence collection is arbitrary and unconstrained is false.” The agency also insisted that it follows procedures to “protect the privacy of U.S. persons” whose communications are “incidentally collected.”
Informed about the NSA’s spying, neither the Bahamian prime minister’s office nor the country’s national security minister had any comment. The embassies of Mexico, Kenya, and the Philippines did not respond to phone messages and emails.

Illustration by Josh Begley
In March, The Washington Post revealed that the NSA had developed the capability to record and store an entire nation’s phone traffic for 30 days. The Post reported that the  capacity was a feature of MYSTIC, which it described as a “voice interception program” that is fully operational in one country and proposed for activation in six others. (The Post also referred to NSA documents suggesting that MYSTIC was pulling metadata in some of those countries.) Citing government requests, the paper declined to name any of those countries.
The Intercept has confirmed that as of 2013, the NSA was actively using MYSTIC to gather cell-phone metadata in five countries, and was intercepting voice data in two of them. Documents show that the NSA has been generating intelligence reports from MYSTIC surveillance in the Bahamas, Mexico, Kenya, the Philippines, and one other country, which The Intercept is not naming in response to specific, credible concerns that doing so could lead to increased violence. The more expansive full-take recording capability has been deployed in both the Bahamas and the unnamed country.
MYSTIC was established in 2009 by the NSA’s Special Source Operations division, which works with corporate partners to conduct surveillance. Documents in the Snowden archive describe it as a “program for embedded collection systems overtly installed on target networks, predominantly for the collection and processing of wireless/mobile communications networks.”

A top-secret description of the MYSTIC program written by the NSA’s Special Source Operations division
If an entire nation’s cell-phone calls were a menu of TV shows, MYSTIC would be a cable programming guide showing which channels offer which shows, and when. SOMALGET would be the DVR that automatically records every show on every channel and stores them for a month. MYSTIC provides the access; SOMALGET provides the massive amounts of storage needed to archive all those calls so that analysts can listen to them at will after the fact. According to one NSA document, SOMALGET is “deployed against entire networks” in the Bahamas and the second country, and processes “over 100 million call events per day.”
SOMALGET’s capabilities are further detailed in a May 2012 memo written by an official in the NSA’s International Crime and Narcotics division. The memo hails the “great success” the NSA’s drugs and crime unit has enjoyed through its use of the program, and boasts about how “beneficial” the collection and recording of every phone call in a given nation can be to intelligence analysts.
Rather than simply making “tentative analytic conclusions derived from metadata,” the memo notes, analysts can follow up on hunches by going back in time and listening to phone calls recorded during the previous month. Such “retrospective retrieval” means that analysts can figure out what targets were saying even when the calls occurred before the targets were identified. “[W]e buffer certain calls that MAY be of foreign intelligence value for a sufficient period to permit a well-informed decision on whether to retrieve and return specific audio content,” the NSA official reported.
“There is little reason,” the official added, that SOMALGET could not be expanded to more countries, as long as the agency provided adequate engineering, coordination and hardware. There is no indication in the documents that the NSA followed up on the official’s enthusiasm.

A 2012 memo written by the NSA’s International Crime & Narcotics division
The documents don’t spell out how the NSA has been able to tap the phone calls of an entire country. But one memo indicates that SOMALGET data is covertly acquired under the auspices of “lawful intercepts” made through Drug Enforcement Administration “accesses”– legal wiretaps of foreign phone networks that the DEA requests as part of international law enforcement cooperation.
When U.S. drug agents need to tap a phone of a suspected drug kingpin in another country, they call up their counterparts and ask them set up an intercept. To facilitate those taps, many nations – including the Bahamas – have hired contractors who install and maintain so-called lawful intercept equipment on their telecommunications. With SOMALGET, it appears that the NSA has used the access those contractors developed to secretly mine the country’s entire phone system for “signals intelligence” –recording every mobile call in the country. “Host countries,” the document notes, “are not aware of NSA’s SIGINT collection.”
“Lawful intercept systems engineer communications vulnerabilities into networks, forcing the carriers to weaken,” says Christopher Soghoian, the principal technologist for the American Civil Liberties Union. “Host governments really should be thinking twice before they accept one of these Trojan horses.”
The DEA has long been in a unique position to help the NSA gain backdoor access to foreign phone networks. “DEA has close relationships with foreign government counterparts and vetted foreign partners,” the manager of the NSA’s drug-war efforts reported in a 2004 memo. Indeed, with more than 80 international offices, the DEA is one of the most widely deployed U.S. agencies around the globe.
But what many foreign governments fail to realize is that U.S. drug agents don’t confine themselves to simply fighting narcotics traffickers. “DEA is actually one of the biggest spy operations there is,” says Finn Selander, a former DEA special agent who works with the drug-reform advocacy group Law Enforcement Against Prohibition. “Our mandate is not just drugs. We collect intelligence.”
What’s more, Selander adds, the NSA has aided the DEA for years on surveillance operations. “On our reports, there’s drug information and then there’s non-drug information,” he says. “So countries let us in because they don’t view us, really, as a spy organization.”
Selander’s first-hand experience is echoed in the 2004 memo by the manager of the NSA’s drug-war efforts, which was titled “DEA: The Other Warfighter.” The DEA and the NSA “enjoy a vibrant two-way information-sharing relationship,” the memo observes, and cooperate so closely on counternarcotics and counterterrorism that there is a risk of “blurring the lines between the two missions.”
Still, the ability to record and replay the phone calls of an entire country appears to be a relatively new weapon in the NSA’s arsenal. None of the half-dozen former U.S. law enforcement officials interviewed by The Intercept said they had ever heard of a surveillance operation quite like the NSA’s Bahamas collection.
“I’m completely unfamiliar with the program,” says Joel Margolis, a former DEA official who is now executive vice president of government affairs for Subsentio, a Colorado-based company that installs lawful intercepts for telecommunications providers. “I used to work in DEA’s office of chief counsel, and I was their lead specialist on lawful surveillance matters. I wasn’t aware of anything like this.”

A 2012 memo written by the NSA’s International Crime & Narcotics division
For nearly two decades, telecom providers in the United States have been legally obligated under the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act to build their networks with wiretapping capabilities, providing law enforcement agencies with access to more efficient, centrally managed surveillance.
Since CALEA’s passage, many countries have adopted similar measures, making it easier to gather telecommunications intelligence for international investigations. A 2001 working group for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime went so far as to urge countries to consider permitting foreign law enforcement agencies to initiate international wiretaps directly from within their own territories.
The process for setting up lawful intercepts in foreign countries is largely the same as in the United States. “Law enforcement issues a warrant or other authorization, a carrier or a carrier’s agent responds to the warrant by provisioning the intercept, and the information is sent in sort of a one-way path to the law enforcement agency,” says Marcus Thomas, a former FBI assistant director who now serves as chief technology officer for Subsentio.
When U.S. drug agents wiretap a country’s phone networks, they must comply with the host country’s laws and work alongside their law enforcement counterparts. “The way DEA works with our allies – it could be Bahamas or Jamaica or anywhere – the host country has to invite us,” says Margolis. “We come in and provide the support, but they do the intercept themselves.”
The Bahamas’ Listening Devices Act requires all wiretaps to be authorized in writing either by the minister of national security or the police commissioner in consultation with the attorney general. The individuals to be targeted must be named. Under the nation’s Data Protection Act, personal data may only be “collected by means which are both lawful and fair in the circumstances of the case.” The office of the Bahamian data protection commissioner, which administers the act, said in a statement that it “was not aware of the matter you raise.”
Countries like the Bahamas don’t install lawful intercepts on their own. With the adoption of international standards, a thriving market has emerged for private firms that are contracted by foreign governments to install and maintain lawful intercept equipment. Currently valued at more than $128 million, the global market for private interception services is expected to skyrocket to more than $970 million within the next four years, according to a 2013 report from the research firm Markets and Markets.
“Most telecom hardware vendors will have some solutions for legal interception,” says a former mobile telecommunications engineer who asked not to be named because he is currently working for the British government. “That’s pretty much because legal interception is a requirement if you’re going to operate a mobile phone network.”
The proliferation of private contractors has apparently provided the NSA with direct access to foreign phone networks. According to the documents, MYSTIC draws its data from “collection systems” that were overtly installed on the telecommunications systems of targeted countries, apparently by corporate “partners” cooperating with the NSA.
One NSA document spells out that “the overt purpose” given for accessing foreign telecommunications systems is “for legitimate commercial service for the Telco’s themselves.” But the same document adds: “Our covert mission is the provision of SIGINT,” or signals intelligence.
The classified 2013 intelligence budget also describes MYSTIC as using “partner-enabled” access to both cellular and landline phone networks. The goal of the access, the budget says, is to “provide comprehensive metadata access and content against targeted communications” in the Caribbean, Mexico, Kenya, the Philippines, and the unnamed country. The budget adds that in the Bahamas, Mexico, and the Philippines, MYSTIC requires “contracted services” for its “operational sustainment.”

Definitions of terms related to the MYSTIC program, drawn from an NSA glossary
The NSA documents don’t specify who is providing access in the Bahamas. But they do describe SOMALGET as an “umbrella term” for systems provided by a private firm, which is described elsewhere in the documents as a “MYSTIC access provider.” (The documents don’t name the firm, but rather refer to a cover name that The Intercept has agreed not to publish in response to a specific, credible concern that doing so could lead to violence.) Communications experts consulted by The Intercept say the descriptions in the documents suggest a company able to install lawful intercept equipment on phone networks.
Though it is not the “access provider,” the behemoth NSA contractor General Dynamics is directly involved in both MYSTIC and SOMALGET. According to documents, the firm has an eight-year, $51 million contract to process “all MYSTIC data and data for other NSA accesses” at a facility in  Annapolis Junction, Maryland, down the road from NSA’s  headquarters. NSA logs of SOMALGET collection activity – communications between analysts about issues such as outages and performance problems – contain references to a technician at a “SOMALGET processing facility” who bears the same name as a LinkedIn user listing General Dynamics as his employer. Reached for comment, a General Dynamics spokesperson referred questions to the NSA.
According to the NSA documents, MYSTIC targets calls and other data transmitted on  Global System for Mobile Communications networks – the primary framework used for cell phone calls worldwide. In the Philippines, MYSTIC collects “GSM, Short Message Service (SMS) and Call Detail Records” via access provided by a “DSD asset in a Philippine provider site.” (The DSD refers to the Defence Signals Directorate, an arm of Australian intelligence. The Australian consulate in New York declined to comment.) The operation in Kenya is “sponsored” by the CIA, according to the documents, and collects “GSM metadata with the potential for content at a later date.” The Mexican operation is likewise sponsored by the CIA. The documents don’t say how or under what pretenses the agency is gathering call data in those countries.
In the Bahamas, the documents say, the NSA intercepts GSM data that is transmitted over what is known as the “A link”–or “A interface”–a core component of many mobile networks. The A link transfers data between two crucial parts of GSM networks – the base station subsystem, where phones in the field communicate with cell towers, and the network subsystem, which routes calls and text messages to the appropriate destination. “It’s where all of the telephone traffic goes,” says the former engineer.
Punching into this portion of a county’s mobile network would give the NSA access to a virtually non-stop stream of communications. It would also require powerful technology.
“I seriously don’t think that would be your run-of-the-mill legal interception equipment,” says the former engineer, who worked with hardware and software that typically maxed out at 1,000 intercepts. The NSA, by contrast, is recording and storing tens of millions of calls – “mass surveillance,” he observes, that goes far beyond the standard practices for lawful interception recognized around the world.
The Bahamas Telecommunications Company did not respond to repeated phone calls and emails.
If the U.S. government wanted to make a case for surveillance in the Bahamas, it could point to the country’s status as a leading haven for tax cheats, corporate shell games, and a wide array of black-market traffickers. The State Department considers the Bahamas both a “major drug-transit country” and a “major money laundering country” (a designation it shares with more than 60 other nations, including the U.S.). According to the International Monetary Fund, as of 2011 the Bahamas was home to 271 banks and trust companies with active licenses. At the time, the Bahamian banks held $595 billion in U.S. assets.
But the NSA documents don’t reflect a concerted focus on the money launderers and powerful financial institutions – including numerous Western banks – that underpin the black market for narcotics in the Bahamas. Instead, an internal NSA presentation from 2013 recounts with pride how analysts used SOMALGET to locate an individual who “arranged Mexico-to-United States marijuana shipments” through the U.S. Postal Service.
A slide from a 2013 NSA Special Source Operations presentation
The presentation doesn’t say whether the NSA shared the information with the DEA. But the drug agency’s Special Operations Divison has come under fire for improperly using classified information obtained by the NSA to launch criminal investigations – and then creating false narratives to mislead courts about how the investigations began. The tactic – known as parallel construction – was first reported by Reuters last year, and is now under investigation by the Justice Department’s inspector general.
So: Beyond a desire to bust island pot dealers, why would the NSA choose to apply a powerful collection tool such as SOMALGET against the Bahamas, which poses virtually no threat to the United States?
The answer may lie in a document that characterizes the Bahamas operation as a “test bed for system deployments, capabilities, and improvements” to SOMALGET. The country’s small population – fewer than 400,000 residents – provides a manageable sample to try out the surveillance system’s features. Since SOMALGET is also operational in one other country, the Bahamas may be used as a sort of guinea pig to beta-test improvements and alterations without impacting the system’s operations elsewhere.
“From an engineering point of view it makes perfect sense,” says the former engineer. “Absolutely.”
Beyond the Bahamas, the other countries being targeted by MYSTIC are more in line with the NSA’s more commonly touted priorities. In Kenya, the U.S. works closely with local security forces in combating the militant fundamentalist group Al-Shabab, based in neighboring Somalia. In the Philippines, the U.S. continues to support a bloody shadow war against Islamist extremists launched by the Bush administration in 2002. Last month, President Barack Obama visited Manila to sign a military pact guaranteeing that U.S. operations in Southeast Asia will continue and expand for at least another decade.
Mexico, another country targeted by MYSTIC, has received billions of dollars in police, military, and intelligence aid from the U.S. government over the past seven years to fight the war on drugs, a conflict that has left more than 70,000 Mexicans dead by some estimates. Attorney General Eric Holder has described Mexican drug cartels as a U.S. “national security threat,” and in 2009, then-CIA director Michael Hayden said the violence and chaos in Mexico would soon be the second greatest security threat facing the U.S. behind Al Qaeda. 

Photo credit: Marcelo A. Salinas/MCT/
The legality of the NSA’s sweeping surveillance in the Bahamas is unclear, given the permissive laws under which the U.S intelligence community operates. Earlier this year, President Obama issued a policy directive imposing “new limits” on the U.S. intelligence community’s use of “signals intelligence collected in bulk.” In addition to threats against military or allied personnel, the directive lists five broad conditions under which the agency would be permitted to trawl for data in unrestricted dragnets: threats posed by foreign powers, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, cybersecurity, and “transnational criminal threats, including illicit finance and sanctions evasion.”
SOMALGET operates under Executive Order 12333, a Reagan-era rule establishing wide latitude for the NSA and other intelligence agencies to spy on other countries, as long as the attorney general is convinced the efforts are aimed at gathering foreign intelligence. In 2000, theNSA assured Congress that all electronic surveillance performed under 12333 “must be conducted in a manner that minimizes the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of information about unconsenting U.S. persons.” In reality, many legal experts point out, the lack of judicial oversight or criminal penalties for violating the order render the guidelines meaningless.
“I think it would be open, whether it was legal or not,” says German, the former FBI agent. “Because we don’t have all the facts about how they’re doing it. For a long time, the NSA has been interpreting their authority in the broadest possible way, even beyond what an objective observer would say was reasonable.”
“An American citizen has Fourth Amendment rights wherever they are,” adds Kurt Opsahl, an attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation. “Nevertheless, there have certainly been a number of things published over the last year which suggest that there are broad, sweeping programs that the NSA and other government agencies are doing abroad that sweep up the communications of Americans.”
Legal or not, the NSA’s covert surveillance of an entire nation suggests that it will take more than the president’s tepid “limits” to rein in the ambitions of the intelligence community. “It’s almost like they have this mentality – if we can, we will,” says German. “There’s no analysis of the long-term risks of doing it, no analysis of whether it’s actually worth the effort, no analysis of whether we couldn’t take those resources and actually put them on real threats and do more good.”

It’s not surprising, German adds, that the government’s covert program in the Bahamas didn’t remain covert. “The undermining of international law and international cooperation is such a long-term negative result of these programs that they had to know would eventually be exposed, whether through a leak, whether through a spy, whether through an accident,” he says. “Nothing stays secret forever. It really shows the arrogance of these agencies – they were just going to do what they were going to do, and they weren’t really going to consider any other important aspects of how our long-term security needs to be addressed.”

China’s Central Bank chief admits difficulties with Africa deals.

By Javier Blas in Kigali, RwandaAuthor alerts

Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of China’s Central Bank

Beijing has made a rare and candid admission of the difficulties in its economic relationship with Africa, with one of the country’s top financial officials describing some Sino-African deals as “not so good, not so satisfactory”.

The comments by Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of China’s central bank, appear part of a much broader effort by Beijing to recalibrate its economic and trade relations with Africa in response to growing criticism inside and outside the continent.
“Different entities have behaved differently. There may have been some phenomena of Chinese investors [that were] not so good, not so satisfactory,” Mr Zhou said.

The comments are among the most forthright by senior Chinese officials about troubles in their country’s relationship with the continent, although Mr Zhou did not elaborate about specific deals.

China-Africa trade has surged over the past decade, reaching $200bn last year, up from $10bn in 2000 and $1bn in 1980, according to customs data. About 2,500 Chinese companies have established themselves in Africa over the last two decades.

Li Keqiang, Chinese premier, acknowledged during his first trip to the continent earlier this month that the relationship between Beijing and its African partners had suffered “growing pains”. But he rejected accusations that Beijing was pursuing a neocolonialist policy in Africa seeking the continent’s commodities.

Mr Zhou made his comments after he signed a $2bn deal with the African Development Bank, Beijing’s first ever departure from its “cheque book” policy of multibillion-dollar bilateral deals on the continent. The new fund will open contracts to the most suitable bidder rather than just to Chinese companies.

Western countries have in the past criticised what they describe as Beijing’s “cheque book” policy of lending money to African countries to largely benefit its own construction groups, which have built everything from roads to hospitals on the continent. African officials have complained about the poor quality of some of the Chinese-built infrastructure and the use of migrant labour from China rather than locals.
Ghana last year deported thousands of Chinese workers in a crackdown on illegal mining in the country, while oil workers at two Chinese projects in Chad and Niger went on strike earlier this year in protest at their unequal salaries.

Mr Zhou said the new “Africa growing together” fund was “supplementary” to traditional Chinese lending to the continent, which until now has been channelled exclusively into grants, bilateral loans and infrastructure projects financed by Chinese state-owned banks. “[The fund] provides new flexibility and arenas to operate.”

Deborah Brautigam, an expert on China-Africa relations at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, wrote that the new fund was a “huge change”.

“While the multilateral banks are not immune from corruption and embezzlement challenges, they do have stakeholders that try to hold them accountable in a transparent process,” she said. “That has not been the case with the Chinese policy banks.”

Despite the latest multilateral move, China’s bilateral engagement with Africa remains far larger – and it continues to grow. Mr Li announced during his trip that Beijing would increase its bilateral credit lines to African countries by $10bn, bringing the total to $30bn for 2013-15. He also announced another $2bn for infrastructure. 

Saturday, 17 May 2014

Titles and Templates of Conformity.

Dear Humans,

Today I wish to return to your awareness an aspect of the Human condition that readily conforms to labels and titles. Titles come in all flavors, shapes and sizes, so everybody gets to have one. Some seem rather impressive, whereas others are a bit more diminutive indeed. But in most every case, we assume our respective roles and seek to further refine our character. Like an actor on stage, we wear our persona as if it were a type of costume, then parade about as if the show must go on.

So the question becomes just how intrusive are these titles and labels? Do they adequately define who we are or do they merely press into shape what others expect of us? Do we create our label or does it create us? One would hardly expect the pastor of a local church to get tanked-up at the corner watering hole. His label does not permit it— although he may desire it. So there would certainly appear to be a thin line between title and self-image. One must wonder just how deeply rooted these labels really are? If suddenly stripped free of our title and role, would we cease to be who we thought we were? 

Essentially every day I see people working their jobs, trying to earn their pay. They all have titles. Society loves to add varying degrees of authority to the seemingly infinite array of titles. You may, for instance, converse with a cashier at a grocery store. You might notice that she’s a “lead” cashier. She’s not as jovial or forthcoming as the cashier from the other day, but she’s admirably efficient and dutiful. You remember the other cashier was not near as proficient, but considerably more effervescent. She was designated as a “trainee.” It said so right on her badge. They both seemed to have adopted their roles accordingly, and maybe in some ways, their roles adopted them.

In the following paragraphs I invite you to explore whether a title makes the person or the person makes the title. I strongly suspect both elements are tightly woven together. Some people can slip into their respective role as comfortably as a favorite pair of jeans. Others must stretch and pull and begrudgingly admit how they never found comfort with the fit. Still others are simply unaware that there’s a big, shiny label stamped across their forehead. Should you ask them who they are— they will predictively respond by stating name and title. This is a vestige of societal de-education. Should they find the clarity to ask themselves the question— one might wonder if the answer would be the same.

Titles and Templates

Throughout our lives we choose various labels and titles and play the roles accordingly. Sometimes others are more than happy to choose a label for us. It may start as something as simple and seemingly innocuous as a nickname. You may hate the nickname but it sticks anyway. Soon you begin to associate and be associated with something you dislike. So either one finds an acceptable place to break the link, or they become ultimately chained to an external label that never represented how they felt in the first place. This can be especially difficult for a child when others latch onto a certain birth anomaly, weight or stature issue, speech impediment or something to this effect. 

Some seek higher education and desire a title that will bring them distinction and influence. That’s an honest pursuit. There’s often a connection to a particular field of study that’s a natural fit for the student. The title is an added perk that comes with the package. But then there are those who are title seekers. It’s about the power and prestige that accompanies a certain position. They may wield authority like a butcher waves a knife. For them, a title is a tool for leverage. –Exit stage left.

But one thing all titles have in common is their respective templates of conformity. You’ll notice when speaking with most any professional, they assume a professional persona. This is an energy that is fairly easy to detect. As the conversation continues, there’s a tendency to conform to their template of expression. Usually we do so subconsciously. It’s a form of energetic modeling that comes very naturally to Humans. When the exchange of energy is fairly coherent and the templates are meshing, the conversation proceeds with little to no stress. We all know that feeling.

These templates are everywhere. Whether it’s a medical doctor, grocery clerk, bank teller, policeman, soldier, school teacher or an owner of a flower shop, the templates are in place and are clear as day for those who can see them. But it’s an artificial extension of who we really are. Society mandates that we build a synthetic construct around us. We pin a label on it, then surrender to it. So we look to our title and assume the role— and the next thing you know we’re calling ourselves something that we’re not. 

Is this truly our Human nature— or is it yet another example of how our race has been cultivated for the kill? I wonder. I make this point because we are always a little on guard when assuming a persona that may not be the person we truly are. So we go through life pretending to be something we’re not, with the hope of someday breaking away from this nightmarish construct we’ve found ourselves trapped in. But that’s only true for the ones who are conscious of the templates. Most are not. Most are so steeped in the illusion of the matrix they wouldn’t know a template if it smacked them dead on the head. They don’t realize they are assuming roles of compliancy and have been pressed into service with templates of conformity.
Who Are We Really

I sense a good number of people would wrestle with this question. I know I do. Some claim to know, but seem unable to elaborate. Others have tried very sincerely to get to the bottom of it all and make it clearer for the rest of us. I can tell you this much. We likely had a sense of who we were from the day we were born. Thinking back to when I was about four years old, I can remember feeling a certain exuberance that I would later lose as an adult. I had a sense of being the center of my world, and I was happy with that. Sometime later I would discover that this state of mind was labeled “egocentrism.” Well I sure didn’t want any part of that. In hindsight, I now realize that being at the center of your world is a very good thing and not at all associated with being egotistical. But the inference was there none-the-less.

No way can you be thinking you’re “the center of your world” in a mind-controlled society. Society is the center of your world, so get that straight right now young man! I remember feeling what could only be described as an Eternal love in those very early years. It gave me considerable comfort. Yes— I can remember bits and pieces of this state of mind. It was from this point, several years ago, where I made the conscious choice to rebuild my life one stone at a time. I set out to retrace the steps of my life so that I could reexamine at what point I was pulled away from my true self, then asked to assume a new role.

And so along my journey I began to see the world from a different perspective. The matrix became obvious. So did the templates. So did a good many other things. The world was looking more and more like a silly game to me. But some of the “players” were clearly not so nice— downright creepy at times. I began to feel like an alien in my own world. In a sense, I still do. Now I walk around with curious fascination. I think to myself, “do people not see the roles they are playing?” Perhaps it’s all here merely for my entertainment, I muse. But I don’t much care for this play. -Too violent for my liking. As many of you know, walking through this world with an ability to “see” is perhaps the strangest show of all— bizarre and intricate with an ever-changing plot. Bravo! Actors— please take a bow! Now will someone lower the damn curtain? I have to pee and the meter is about to run out on my parking spot.

So who are we and where did we come from? The best time to approach people with this novel question is when they are very young. The plasticity of a developing mind is such where wonderful ideas come about easily. They have not been strained through the rigid channels of conformity or templates of normalcy. But instead of asking children to express themselves so that we might learn from them, we proceed by funneling all kinds of nonsense into their fertile imaginations. Soon they are bombarded with religious dogma and assorted twisted tales that cloud their inner awareness. Such information is often presented as the “gospel truth” and so you better believe it—or else! The child begins to separate from “their” truth and conform to the societal templates that dictate truth, authority and normalcy. —Sort of makes me want to cry.