Community Advocacy on Environmental and Social Justice

Sunday, 2 November 2014

Community Organizing: UN Science Panel shows importance of climate actio...

Community Organizing: UN Science Panel shows importance of climate actio...: Climate scientists in the UN panel on climate change (IPCC) are wrapping up their latest meeting, held in Copenhagen over the past week. T...

UN Science Panel shows importance of climate action now

Climate scientists in the UN panel on climate change (IPCC) are wrapping up their latest meeting, held in Copenhagen over the past week. Their fifth report is fresh on the table, and it is full of predictions about our future.
The head of the ACT Alliance delegation to the meeting, Mattias Söderberg, says:
“Scientists are giving us a preview of a huge bill we will have to pay for the effects of climate change. The cheapest path forwards - for people, companies and governments - is to invest in climate action now. Transforming our countries for a low carbon future will save lives and money”.
“The report highlights that climate change will have an increasing impact on food security, and that there are limits for adaptation to the increasing global temperature. Sea level rise and persistent droughts will force many people to move.” Söderberg says.
“For the families and communities that are going to be hardest hit, the report is a horrific prediction. We can’t adapt our way out of all of this. We will see more disasters and less production of nutritious food, more people will be displaced and more will go hungry”.
“Politicians around the world must act on these predictions and there is no time to waste. We need to do whatever we can to reduce our emissions, help people to adapt, and where this is not possible, help displaced people to settle and move on with their lives somewhere else”.
“The report warns about the risk of violent conflicts, with drivers such as poverty and financial shocks increasing due to climate change”.
“As civil society organisations working on development, we know far to well about the risks of war and armed conflicts. Poor and vulnerable people are normally the hardest hit, as they lack possibilities to avoid, or cope with the threats. With these links between climate change and conflicts becoming clearer, it’s even more important to address global warming”. 
The report stresses that it still is possible to do something. Urgent mitigation action can reduce emissions, and an increased focus on adaptation can help communities and countries with disaster risk preparedness and resilience. However, the report also emphasises that global cooperation and collective action is necessary.
Söderberg adds that “the IPCC report is a direct input to the current UN process, to adopt a global climate change agreement in Paris in December 2015. Governments must adhere to the report, and base their positions and commitments on the recent science. The UN climate talks are in a critical phase, where parties will present their intended contributions to the future agreement. As such the IPCC report is extremely timely. Governments should now reconsider their targets in light of the new findings.”
For more information contact Mattias Söderberg:  msd@dca.dk  +45 29700609

Wednesday, 18 June 2014

World Day to Combat Desertification: Using Nuclear Technology to Strengthen Soil and Water Conservation Strategies


    Soils are critical for all life—they act as a water filter and growing medium, supply nutrients for plant growth and contribute to biodiversity.  Yet, despite the universal importance of healthy soil, we continue to lose approximately 5 to 7 million hectares each year through soil degradation – 24 billion tons of this non-renewable resource have been lost over the last century from the world’s arable land. Today, land and soil degradation affect approximately 1.5 billion people, and not just in arid or dry environments.
    June 17 is World Day to Combat Desertification, and this year’s theme is ‘Land Belongs to the Future - Let’s Climate Proof’. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), through its technical cooperation programme and the Joint FAO/IAEA Division, is helping Member States to address this goal by supporting the collection of data on soil and water interactions. Nuclear technology, and radioactive and stable isotope techniques in particular, play a very important part in collecting such data, which can be used by policy makers to make evidence-based decisions on strategies to combat soil erosion. Moreover, in the fight against food insecurity, water use efficiency (WUE) remains one of the most effective strategies.
    IAEA technical cooperation (TC) projects assist Member States to improve soil fertility and build capacities for soil conservation and land use planning. Radionuclide and stable isotopic techniques can be used to study soil erosion and land degradation problems. Nuclear technology can also help countries to assess and improve their soil and water management practices. In addition, environmentally friendly tracer elements can be applied to effectively determine the optimal placement and timing of fertilizers and water, and to determine how much nitrogen plants can capture from the atmosphere within a given cropping rotation.
    In Qatar, for example, around 600 km2 of abandoned arable saline land and 800 km2 of inland coastline could not be used for agricultural purposes. Through technical cooperation, the Agency has supported national efforts to improve agricultural productivity in these areas, aiming to enhance sustainable biomass production through the growth of salt-tolerant plants on saline lands irrigated with renewable brackish or treated sewage water resources. In particular, the project addressed irrigation scheduling under conditions of extreme salinity and very high temperatures, using a neutron probe, a device that measures soil moisture by producing fast neutrons that collide with the hydrogen atoms in water and soil.  Isotopes were also used to assess nutrient use efficiency by salt-tolerant crops.
    In Kenya, agricultural productivity is low, and nutrient and water use efficiency is limited. The IAEA is helping the country to increase productivity in mixed cropping systems by promoting the use of an integrated approach to agriculture that enhances soil fertility and improves crop water productivity. Isotope technology is used to assess nitrogen uptake by plants, and neutron probes have been applied to assess the soil water balance. In addition, nuclear techniques are being used to examine water stress in plants, and to generate data that will support decision-making on appropriate farming systems. 
    New projects are also coming online to help Member States improve their soil management, and are seeking to engage with other international actors working in this area. A regional TC project, inaugurated in 2014 and conducted with the support of AFRA, is focusing on water use efficiency in order to alleviate both water scarcity and low soil fertility in the Africa region. These two challenges can affect the productivity of land, especially among smaller farms, and in turn aggravate problems like food insecurity and poverty. A similar regional project is being organized in the Asia and the Pacific region, where population growth, economic development, and a growing demand for livestock agriculture has put pressure on the limited soil and water resources of the region, particularly in the face of climate change and variation. Through the project, 16 Member States are collaborating to improve the fertility and productivity of their soils with the IAEA’s support on the integrated use of fallout radionuclides (FRN) and compound specific stable isotopes (CSSI) to identify the extent and sources of soil erosion/degradation so that cost-effective soil conservation measures can be targeted to mitigate land degradation and enhance soil and water ecosystem services at both farm and landscape levels. Effective soil conservation strategies are being put in place in many participating countries such as China and Vietnam based on the results obtained from this regional technical cooperation project. The IAEA continues to coordinate the project, in addition to organizing workshops, providing technological support, and building local capacities.
    Finally, another new TC project is helping to build national capacities in Latin America in the use of both FRN and CSSI techniques. These techniques are used to assess soil redistribution in agricultural landscapes and commercial forest plantations in Latin America, and to identify hotspots of soil erosion at the landscape level. The project aims to provide facts and figures on soil erosion to decision-makers and relevant authorities in the Latin America region in support of agricultural strategy and planning. The results of the sample collection will be put into a soil map for Latin America. The first coordination meeting for the project, which took place in Chile in April 2014, was attended by representatives from the Global Environment Facility, the Food and Agriculture Organization’s Global Soil Partnership and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). This enabled meeting participants to interact with the international organizations that are supporting efforts to better understand soil erosion, or devising or funding approaches to mitigate the impact of soil erosion on food production.

Wednesday, 4 June 2014

Kenya:Getting it right: the security agencies in modern society.

By Robin Ramsay

Lobster has had its moments. It has been denounced in the House of Commons...
Where were the shouts of derision... when MI5 and MI6... overspent the budgets
on their new builings by £200 million... why do MPs take no notice... The Labour Party's
passivity... is a more compled phenomenon...
A member of [Neil Kinnock's] personal staff actually phoned 'Spycatcher' Peter Wright
in Australia... every phone within a mile of Wright and his legal team was tapped
of course... the information about the call from Kinnock's office was duly passed --
presumably from the NSA via GCHQ -- to the Tories. Mrs Thatcher then stood up in
the Commons and denounced Kinnock for talking to a traitor... [Kinnock] should have
asked how she knew the contents of the phone call...
Peter Mandelson... has been around MI6 since his early 20s... Four of the Blair
cabinet are alumni of the Anglo-American elite group the British American Project;
three of the Blair cabinet have passed muster at Bildeberg meetings...
Meanwhile MI6 have returned to planting disinformation in the British Media -- most of it...
going into the Sunday Telegraph...
The topic was suggested to me by Kevin O'Brien [of ICSA]. It wasn't clear to me if it was simply that I was being played out a very long piece of rope with which to hang myself. At any rate, given such a wide title - and a title to which I cannot possibly actually do justice - and given my complete lack of knowledge about the audience to whom I was delivering the talk, I decided to chuck out a bunch of ideas in the hope of providing some-thing juicy for you to have a go at. Incidentally, I do actually respond briefly to the stated title at the end of the piece.A preface: in what follows I use the terms security agencies and secret state to stand for the intelligence and security services - it saves time and endless repetition of a mouthful. Or should I say: I use the term security agencies in place of the intelligence, security and surveillance services, MI6, MI5, GCHQ. Or should I say: I use the term security agencies to stand for the intelligence, security, surveillance and disinformation services? Because disinforming the British citizen is certainly a current aim of at last two of those bodies. Or should it be the intelligence, security, surveillance, disinformation and fucking-up-the-lives-of-certain-people-the-state-finds-awkward-or-irritating services? Because that, too, is an aim of at least one of the 'security agencies'. To that last category I will return.
I am a generalist not a specialist. I could say that my main interest is in the interface between the political and the intelligence worlds; between secret and authoritarian; between open and democratic. But really I'm just interested in the nature of political and historical reality. I've read Professor Freedman's excellent book on the U.S. intelligence estimating process; (2) but I also read books about UFOs. Both are part of political reality as I see it. Indeed both overlap: the CIA is certainly interested in UFOs. A loose alliance of intelligence officers in America, led by a CIA officer named Ron Pandolphi, has spent the last 20 years running disinformation at the American UFO buffs. If you have watched the X Files TV programme you have been watching themes first invented by Pandolphi and his crew.
Which is an oblique way into this: the security agencies, the intelligence agencies, are a part of political reality; and maybe a big part - certainly a bigger part than orthodox historians and political scientists would have us believe.

Denounced by a former IRD head

I'm here because I have been publishing a little magazine called Lobster for 17 years, part of whose content has been information about, and critical commentaries on, the activities of the British and American - mostly British - security agencies. To intelligence professionals, no doubt, the little I have managed to learn and publish is laughable, both in content and quantity. Even so, Lobsterhas had its moments. It has been denounced in the House of Commons by Ray Whitney, former head of the Information Research Department, IRD, the state's official, anti-left, psy-war outfit. Oddly enough this was something he omitted to tell the Commons before denouncing me; not that one MP in 50 would know what IRD was had he referred to it.That I am aware of, I have had two agents of the British secret state - from MI5, I presume - sicced onto me to pick my brains. This happened in 1987/8 when I was deeply embroiled with Colin Wallace and his story about anti-Labour hanky panky in Northern Ireland. I was on the phone to him every day and was talking to lots of journalists who were trying to understand his story. Wallace and I assumed our phones were tapped - though we never had any evidence of this; none of the noises, interference and fragments of recorded conversation played back other people were reporting at that time. Being essentially a one-man band even then - my erstwhile partner Stephen Dorril had abandoned Lobster to write a book - Lobster must have presented a peculiar problem to an organisation like MI5. How do you penetrate a one man band? After you have the phonetaps on and the mail intercept, what else is there to do? In the case of something like CND it's easy: someone is sent to join and then volunteer to work at head office. Incidentally, the talk of MI5 'penetrating' CND is a joke: any member could work in head office. It was an open organisation, it ran on volunteers and it had no secrets.
So here we were in 1987: MI5 contemplating what to do about Lobster.
What they did was really quite subtle. I was a fairly serious runner than and used to regularly run round the grass perimeter of the University of Hull playing fields. There were three of us running round this field at lunch-times and eventually we got to talking in the changing rooms, and then went for a beer afterwards; and I became friends with one of them, a post-doc researcher, a man called... let's call him John. Nice guy: on a similar wavelength to me politically; interesting life; good stories; good drinking companion - and, of course, he was really interested in the little magazine I was publishing and what I was working on. At that point nobody in Hull was interested in what I was doing and I was happy to talk to him. I had no secrets.
About 6 months after I met him I got a call from an American journalist I know called Jim Hougan. Hougan had been chatting to a friend, who had a contact in the FBI and somehow this little magazine produced in Hull, England, came up. Don't worry about Lobster, was the message, Lobster has been penetrated. That seemed absolutely hilarious to Hougan and me. Typical spook bullshit, we thought, claiming to have penetrated an organisation consisting of one man. We had a good laugh down the transatlantic phone line and I forgot about it.
About a month later, as I was cycling through Hull city centre, out of a clear blue sky, without any conscious musings on my part, I thought: 'It must be John' - and about six months experience suddenly reorganised itself in my head. Yes, it was my new running, drinking, talking, buddy John. He'd been pretty clever about it but I knew it was him. Through his girlfriend I let him know I had sussed him and I never saw him again.
That, you might think, would be the end of it. Not so. A few weeks went by and another person tried to attach himself to me, this time claiming to be to be a former MI5 agent who would spill the beans. But he was ill, so ill, and the NHS in London was so bad.....This goes on for some weeks and I initially take him seriously and begin badgering doctors in London.... Then one day he says, 'What's the NHS like in Hull?' Maybe he could move to Hull and get treatment..... then he would tell me wonderful tales of MI5.....
At 'moving to Hull' I put the phone down on him. He called himself Sammy. He had been an actor and claimed that MI5 and Special Branches used him to penetrate left organisations.
Somewhere in Whitehall there must still be files on that operation - a brilliant example of the way our secret state wastes money. Because there was nothing to find out. I had no secret sources: with my mail opened and my phone tapped they knew as much as there was to know.

Running Soviet themes?

I have been accused of running Soviet disinformation by Herb Rommerstein, a big cheese in the United States Information Service during the Reagan years. In fact in all the years I have been doing this I have never seen a piece of Soviet disinformation. I have seen lots of British and some American disinformation; but even the few examples of Soviet disinformation described by Oleg Gordievsky never came my way. And no-one on the Rommerstein side of things has produced a critique showing me how I had - wittingly or unwittingly - been running Soviet themes throughLobster. Perhaps I have; I would be interested to be shown how and where. More recently I have been accused a couple of times of being a front for MI6 by American conspiracy theory nutters. But that's about par for the course in these fields.The examples of Soviet disinformation offered by Gordi-evsky from the 1980s in his book KGB were laughably incompetent, forgeries which would fool no-one and which had zero distribution as far as I know on this country's left. And their incompetence brings me to the first point I want to make today.
In the last decade of the the cold war the Soviet Union - the Soviet state - was portrayed in the West as a vast chaotic shambles in which nothing worked, all was cheap and second rate; a state which never managed to produce a decent refrigerator, and whose chosen motor car was the Lada, built on the cast-off assembly line from the Fiat factories. Oddly enough though, in the midst of this ocean of mediocrity there were apparently exceptions - oases of excellence. Somehow the Soviet military - and the Soviet intelligence services - had escaped the bureaucratic nightmare which was the Soviet command economy and had become the exception which proved the rule: they were efficient and a deadly threat to us. This never seemed likely to me and I was delighted to read the book by the pseudonymous Soviet defector Viktor Suvorov, called The Liberators: inside the Soviet Army. In The Liberators, published in London in 1981, Suvorov portrayed the Soviet armed forces I expected to find: a brutal, inefficient, cynical, farcical army of conscripts, skiving off at the first opportunity and doing their best to stay permanently smashed on anythingthey could smoke, drink or inject - the mirror image of wider Soviet society, in short; and about as threatening to NATO as the girl guides.
Alas for Suvorov, his handlers in the British (?) state did not seem happy with this portrayal of the Soviet armed forces and the next year he published - or put his name to - another book whose main title was the subtitle of his previous book: Inside the Soviet Army. In the year since The Liberators Mr Suvorov had experienced a dramatic change of memory and his second book presented the efficient, menacing, Red Army required by Western intelligence and military budgets. Suvorov subsequently wrote - or put his name to - a whole slew of books amplifying the Soviet menace in the 1980s. The range of his expertise was astonishing for a relatively junior officer............. Flipping through some of those recently I was reminded of Derek Draper's immortal response to the question, 'Did you actually write your book New Labour's First 100 Days?' 'Write it?' said Draper. 'I didn't even read it.'
File the Suvorov episode away as a dramatic example of the way host countries manipulate defectors; and remember his name the next time you read about the new 'threats' facing NATO.
Looking at the West from the position of the free market right, the state - the public sector - is by definition the quin-tessence of inefficiency: states are neither rational nor efficient distributors of resources. But where are the free market critics of the security agencies? Where were the shouts of derision from stage right when the MI5 and MI6 - so I read - overspent the budgets on their new buildings by £200 million?

Taking the piss

What was that £200 million overspend? What did it mean? First, it was hardly an overspend. I might overspend on my weekly budget; you don't overspend by £200 million. It's the wrong term: but I'm not sure what the correct term would be in bureaucratic language. The £200 million was a big 'fuck you' to the rest of Whitehall - and the politicians. Whitehall couldn't stop them and didn't bother telling the politicians until it had happened. There was the tiniest squeak of outrage from the House of Commons and the whole thing has been buried. Now MI6 sit on the Thames, in all their architectural, post-modern pomp. Think of the contrast between the days of Menzies - even Oldfield - between the willing embrace of anonymity in the service of the state and nation so beautifully and apparently accurately described by John Le CarrÈ, and today's flashy display. If Menzies and Oldfield thought they were playing the master game at some level, they had the good taste not to flaunt it the way today's MI6 are doing. That building is taking the piss; that building is asking to have a grenade fired at it. And the politicians are too afraid to say so.I mentioned that the so-called overspend of £200 million by our secret servants produced a squeak of outrage from the House of Commons. That squeak came from the the Public Accounts Committee. The committee nominally dealing with our secret servants, the Intelligence and Security Committee, said nothing; and said nothing because it is not allowed to say anything not vetted by the FCO - sorry Foreign and Common-wealth Office - and the Home Office. The ISC is invited to do x or y. (3)
For example, on the opening page of the ISC report on the Mitrokhin Inquiry, there is the formal letter from ISC chair Tom King which begins:
Dear Prime Minister, on 13th September 1999 you and the Home Secretary invited the Intelligence and Security committee to examine the policies and procedures....
On p 10 we read,
'The home Secretary wrote to the ISC Chairman on 8th October establishing the inquiry's terms of reference....'
This what you are allowed to do........While the ISC were being invited to look at Mitrokhin and the way he was handled by MI6, messrs Shayler and Tomlinson, the two most important defectors from the British security agencies since Philby, were in exile in one case and in jail in the other. While Shayler was sitting in a French jail the House of Commons had its first debate on the work of the ISC which had produced its first report that summer: neither report nor debate mentioned Shayler.
To my knowledge no Labour politicians have met either of them; not one. None of the ISC members of course; they are forbidden to talk to either Tomlinson or Shayler unless invited to do so by higher authorities. Yes, while Tomlinson and Shayler talked of assassination plots by employees of HMG, our politicians were sitting in the sand pit, given 50 year-old allegations about Melita Norwood to play with - allegations which, even if true, mattered little in 1950 and mean nothing today.
This is taking the piss.

Why are our politicians so passive?

Which brings me to another of the recurring questions of the past 15 years: why are our politicians so passive in this field? Why do MPs sit on the ISC doing degrading, keep-em-busy, shit-work? Why do MPs take no notice of a £200 million overspend? From a Conservative government we would expect nothing else, of course. The security agencies simply are not on their agenda. The Tories are historically the Queen and country party, after all; they have had institutional links with the security agencies for the past 100 years. And while the Tories accept that in general terms the state is often the problem and should be reduced if possible, they also believe that the security agencies are a miraculous exception to the general incompetence of public organisations; are, indeed, paragons of efficiency and virtue which need no supervision. They are splendid chaps, doing a wonderful job. I can hear ISC chair, former Tory Minister of Defence and Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Tom King saying that: 'splendid chaps doing a wonderful job.' Tom King, as they say, isn't the sharpest knife in the kitchen drawer. This may explain why Mr Blair left him in the job when Labour won the election in 1997.The Labour Party's passivity in face of the secret state is a more complex phenomenon. Partly it is simply a reflection of wider passivity in the face of the state per se. The idea that the British state is a problem has never really been part of the culture of the Labour Party. Despite all the evidence to the contrary, the idea - the myth - of civil service neutrality is believed by the upper echelons of the Labour Party. And there is a distant folk memory of Harold Wilson's attempt to challenge the power of the Treasury in his first government - and his defeat by them. In practice the idea that the state is a problem is too difficult, has too many awkward ramifications, for Labour politicians. And if, say, the power of the civil service in an ordinary government department looks too difficult to challenge, the secret state is simply off the agenda at the parliamentary Labour Party level.
In the 1980s doing something about the secret state was on the Labour Party's formal agenda - right at the bottom, it is true, but it was on there. It was there because of pressure from ordinary members of the left-wing of the Labour Party - people like me who had read a few books. In those days it was possible for members to actually do things; these days members are just people who fill in standing order forms and work to elect the candidates picked by head office.
There was no real intent by the leadership group around Neil Kinnock, however. To them it was all just noises off stage, rantings from the left. This changed a little in 1986/87 after the series of revelations from Peter Wright, Colin Wallace and Cathy Massiter which confirmed all but the most paranoid lefty's view of the security agencies' institutional hostility to the Labour Party and Labour movement.
For a few moments there Neil Kinnock even threatened to do something. A member of his personal staff actually phoned 'Spycatcher' Peter Wright in Australia in the run-up to the attempt by the British government to stop the publication of Wright's book. It does not seem to have occurred to Kinnock and co. that every phone within a mile of Wright and his legal team was tapped of course, and the NSA had their resources on the case. The information about the call from Kinnock's office was duly passed - presumably from the NSA via GCHQ - to the Tories. Mrs Thatcher then stood up in the Commons and denounced Kinnock for talking to a traitor. It was one of those moments when a little more wit or bottle might changed things.

Kinnock and his team flunked it

He should have laughed at her - but he didn't. He should have asked her how she knew the content of the phone call - but he didn't. He should have derided her talk of treason and pointed out that Wright, a senior member of MI5, was saying that parts of MI5 had been plotting against his party. He should have raised the cry of treason. But he didn't. In the event, taunted by Mrs Thatcher, Neil Kinnock panicked, rushed to wrap himself in the flag and declare himself a loyal patriotic Brit; and the whole subject of the security agencies was wiped off the Kinnock team's blackboard. And it has never returned.Neil Kinnock panicked, and Labour MPs walk away from this field, because they don't know anything. A Neil Kinnock - even an averagely conscientious MP - has so much to do, so much paper to process, that he or she is never going to be able to read enough to master this field. And this field looks uniquely dangerous to MPs, especially on the left. Nobody with an ounce of career-mindedness is going to take a critical interest in the security agencies. For MPs believe - whether this is a rational belief or not - that the security agencies can destroy them. And in a subject so dangerous no MP is going to be advised what to say. I spent years sending out such advice to Labour MPs: not a word of it was acted on. So: as they don't know what to say or do, they say and do nothing.
It is unclear to me how rational is the belief of MPs that the security agencies could destroy them. It is clear from Colin Wallace's documents that in 1973/4 MI5 was trawling through MPs' private lives gathering dirt. But evidence of security agency-gathered material wrecking MPs careers is thin. There are some cases in the Wilson period of MPs who wanted to become Ministers having their careers blocked by bad references from MI5. But the MP who has done the most attacking of the security agencies, Ken Livingstone, survived and is now Mayor of London.
On the other hand there is the case of Tom Spencer MEP, who until last year was the leader of the Tory group of MEPs in the European Parliament. I remember getting a call from an MEP's researcher in Brussels asking me who Spencer was. 'Never heard of him,' I replied. 'Why?' It turned out Spencer had been asking questions about a rather sensitive American project whose initials are HAARP which links to various mind control and weather modification projects. This was about the only time I made a correct prediction. I said to the researcher something to the effect that Spencer better watch out, because the Yanks would go for him if he continued poking around in that field. And lo and behold, about six months later, Customs just happened to pick his bags to search and just happened to find some cocaine and some porno mags in them. Cue media interest; cue end of Tom Spencer's political career. There is one MP in the Commons who is having a go at the secret state, a Liberal-Democrat called Norman Baker. If you see smear stories about him you will know whence the stories came.
However, the 'Wilson plots' story of the 1986-9 period, the biggest source of information on the activities of the security agencies in this country in the post-war era came and went; and, despite file drawers full of cuttings, it had virtually no effect on the political system. Nobody was fired; no meaningful structural changes were made to the security agencies. It is said that they were persuaded to broaden the base of their recruitment and rely less on the old boy public school network; but no meaningful political oversight, let alone political control, was introduced.
You can tell that nothing has changed because MI5 and MI6 can spend £200 million more than they should have and get away with it. Indeed they must be thinking: why didn't we spend more? They said nothing about £200 million, maybe we could have had £400! The security agencies must love having this lot in office. Utterly ignorant of their activities - and determined to remain ignorant.
For the leadership of the Labour Party the process of becoming respectable, becoming electable, not only meant not challenging the power of the City of London, it also means not challenging - not even talking about - the secret state.
Of course the subject was never on the agenda of the Blair faction. Within his inner group we have Peter Mandelson who has been around MI6 since his early 20s, and Jonathan Powell, ex-FCO in Washington and, it has been alleged, the MI6 man there, before joining Blair. (For this latter charge there is no evidence, to my knowledge; and I suspect that if it were true Mr Tomlinson would have found a way to let us know by now.) Four of the Blair cabinet are alumni of the Anglo-American elite group the British American Project; three of the Blair cabinet have passed muster at Bilderberg meetings; and the entire Defence team in Blair's first Cabinet in 1997 were members or associates of the Trade Union Committee for European and Transatlantic Unity, created by the Americans in the 1970s - probably though not yet provably created by the CIA - and currently funded by NATO.
Blair, like his Conservative Party counterparts, believes - or pretends to believe - that the security agencies are splendid chaps doing a splendid job who need no supervision from mere politicians...
As the publisher of a little magazine interested in this field I have met a number of whistle-blowers and victims of HMG's secret organisations; and in all the cases of which I have knowledge the same pattern emerges: honest, decent, loyal, patriotic members of this society get screwed because they know something the secret state would rather the rest of us didn't now. The secret state's response to Fred Holroyd, Colin Wallace, John Burnes, Harold Smith, and most recently Shayler and Tomlinson, is always the same: never mind the content of what they are saying; never mind their previous service to the state, fuck up their lives. Fred Holroyd was put in a mental hospital. Colin Wallace was framed for manslaughter. Less well known, John Burnes was persecuted by MI5. Persons unknown tried to get him killed by the INLA, then tried to frame him for robbery. A post-grad student at the time, he had his grant withdrawn; and, after training as a teacher, he was blocked by MI5 from teaching. His offence? He had the temerity to fall in love with and marry the wife of Sir Thomas Legg, at the time the Lord Chancellor's Department's liaison with MI5. It was Legg who appointed the judge who oversaw the framing of Colin Wallace. The crazy conspiracy theorists in MI5 concluded that Burnes was a KGB agent who had targeted Legg. Burnes discovered that his wife, Legg's ex, had been using accounts in Burnes' name to launder money for MI6. At one point Burnes sought political asylum in Holland.
And there is Shayler and Tomlinson...
The really stupid thing is that none of these people wanted to blow the whistle, wanted to make trouble. All have been pushed into the role by the incompetent personnel manage-ment of our secret servants.
It amazes me that anyone would work for them, so awful are they to work for. Take Jonathan Moyle, a not very bright, gung-ho Queen and country man. Young Moyle, while at University at Aberystwyth, was a Special Branch snitch who thought it his patriotic duty to tell the local SB who was smoking dope. On graduating he became an agent for - well, MI6 probably, though who knows? Moyle ended up being murdered in Chile. According to the book about him, Moyle wasn't very subtle as an intelligence asset and was poking around the Chilean arms dealer Cardoen - one of Mark Thatcher's friends - while Cardoen was doing a big helicopter deal with the Iraqis. This was in the run-up to the American attack on Iraq. Moyle ended up dead in a wardrobe in Chile and what does the local FCO guy do? Tells the media that Moyle was the victim of an auto-erotic accident: strangled himself while having a wank.
There is lot of this about, apparently. James Rusbridger, the writer on intelligence, apparently died this way; and so, appar-ently, did Tory MP Stephen Milligan, PPS to Jonathan Aitken. Does my nose wrinkle at this? Just a bit, I have to confess.
Maybe there are people here thinking of working for the secret departments of HMG. My advice would be consider the experience of Moyle, John Burnes and Colin Wallace before you do.
One of the major themes of Colin Wallace was the internecine conflicts in Northern Ireland between MI5, MI6, the RUC Special Branch and the Army. These conflicts are still going on. There was a major outbreak of leaks - ie of official secrets - to the press in the early 1990s when the Special Branch was trying to resist MI5's take-over of the anti-terrorism franchise. MI5 won. Part of the reason for MI5's hatred of David Shayler is his revelation of just how incompetent MI5 were in dealing with the IRA in the UK having won that franchise.
Currently there is a major struggle going on between the RUC Special Branch and the Army, with the RUC leaking to the Sunday Times the details of the campaign of assassinations in Northern Ireland by the Army's Force Research Unit, the FRU. A barrow-load of official secrets have been exposed in this one. We have the extraordinary situation in which one arm of the British secret state is trying to bust the journalist concerned, Liam Clarke, for leaking information given to him by another of the state's secret arms.

Telling lies in the Torygraph

Meanwhile MI6 have returned to planting disinformation in the British media - most of it that I can see is going into the Sunday Telegraph. Tomlinson told us about the 20-strong I/Ops - Information Operations - unit in that shiny building on the Thames. But its existence had been visible for a long time. It is increasingly difficult to take the talk of official secrets seriously. TheSunday Telegraph of 24 September carried two pieces from MI6. There was a puff piece by former MI6 officer Alan Petty, using his nom de plume Alan Judd, on the MI6 building in the wake of the IRA attack on it; and there was the latest in the long line of anti-Gaddafi pieces, this one claiming that Libya now has some North Korean ballistic missiles. The only stated source for the allegation was a 'Western intelligence official'.But four months before, on 28 May 2000, the Sunday Times article 'IRA investors make 300% profit out of Gaddafi cash donations', sourced back to 'MI5 documents seen by The Sunday Times', concluded by telling us that Swiss police were 'investigating the supply to Libya from Taiwan of plans and parts for Scud missiles.' Well, does Gaddafi have Taiwanese Scuds (MI5 story planted in the Sunday Times) or North Korean missiles (MI6 story planted in the Sunday Telegraph)?
Sometimes these MI6 planted stories are really laughable. The Sunday Telegraph of 30 July carried a story by Christina Lamb, 'Diplomatic Correspondent' which claimed that Saddam Hussein had sent belly dancing assassins to London to murder his opponents there. Lamb sourced this to 'a Foreign Office official', the traditional euphemism for MI6.
This may seem comic, frivolous even - at worst a waste of public money. But it's more serious than that. The Sunday Times was a serious, respectable newspaper until Andrew Neil became its editor in the mid-1980s and turned it into a mouth-piece for MI5 and the MOD to run their rubbish through. The Sunday Telegraph shows all the signs of going down the same dangerous path. But then I'm an old-fashioned kind of a person who thinks the quality and independence of our mass media is important.
If patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel, secrecy is the first refuge of the incompetent - or the illegal. Because this is the issue. The suspicion of people like me is that the security agencies want secrecy to cover their incompetence and their feather-bedding; and also to conceal activities they would rather we didn't know - activities they shouldn't be engaged in. MI6 is not supposed to be in the business of assassinating foreign leaders, even if that leader is on the Americans' shit list like Milosevic. MI5 is not supposed to be in the business of collecting and distributing the dirt on British MPs - which is what they were doing in the 1970s. What else have they been doing, free from the gaze of politicians and journalists? At root I suspect what they are most keen to conceal is the extent to which they have been working in, manipulating, civil society. The Wilson plots story was an example of these activities erupting into the public gaze.
At each step as the police increase their powers, we hear 'If you are innocent you have nothing to fear'. Anybody who has been half awake in the last 20 years knows that this is simply nonsense; that many - dozens, maybe hundreds - of the innocent have been routinely framed and incarcerated by our legal system. But this statement can be levelled at the security agencies: if what you have been doing is above board, show us the files. Take out the agents' names - fine. Nobody expects to see them. But for the rest.... of course it won't happen, not here; not with politicians as docile and cowed as the ones we currently have.
It is absolutely typical of this society that the recent legislation passed which - allegedly - will protect whistle-blowers, does not encompass the heart of the state: police, military, intelligence. It is absolutely typical that the security agencies have been given blanket immunity from the provision of the Data Protection Act. It is also absolutely typical of our security agencies that rather than be less secretive, less authoritarian, less vindictive, less illegal and less bloody incompetent, they are going to introduce psychometric testing of their employees to try and weed out any future Shaylers and Tomlinsons.
Finally, to return to the title of this talk, the security agencies: getting it right in modern society. In one sense MI6 and MI5 have got it right, are, in fact, a brilliant success. Faced with their biggest crisis of the post-war period, the end of the Red Menace which justified the budgets, the careers and the gongs, they have emerged with budgets renewed, new agendas approved; untouched by the politicians, unsupervised by anyone, still - we are not supposed to laugh - still accountable to the Crown not Parliament ( i.e. to no-one). Both MI6 and MI5 have reacted to the new conditions post Cold War in thoroughly competent, even creative ways. Needing something something to justify the budget, MI6 picked the international drug trade. Far as I know, since MI6 joined the 'war against drugs' the price of cocaine and heroin in the UK at street level has halved: it is now cheaper to get off your face, as they say in Hull, on smack than it is on alcohol. And didn't I read a few months ago that MI6 had persuaded Clare Short to task them to provide her with early warning of coups in the developing world? An honest-to-goodness license to do anything, anywhere. Only a Labour government, timid and ignorant, would fall for a proposal as preposterous as that one.
MI5 hardly paused for breath after losing the KGB 'threat' contained in the Soviet Embassy and its Trade Mission, before acquiring the domestic terrorism franchise from the Met Special Branch and beginning the process of hyping up the animal rights and green activists as a new terrorist threat. (And they are getting a new definition of terrorism run through the Houses of Parliament to support it.)
Of course, only the politicians and some of the media - the handful who are paying any attention at all - take the talk of the war on drugs seriously. MI6 don't, I am sure; any more than they seriously intend to provide Clare Short with an early warning of coups in the Third World. At the higher levels of MI6, MI5 and all the rest they must be chortling in the senior dining rooms at the incredible gullibility of the British political class - and this present lot in particular.
Notes
  1. A talk given at the International Centre for Security Analysis, London, on 8 November 2000.
  2. Professor Lawrence Freedman, head of King's College, to which the ICSA is attached.
  3. The head of the ISC's Secretariat, John Morrison, was at the meeting and told me this was incorrect. At time of going to press I had not found out how the subject matter of ISC's activities is generated. In the 2001 Commons debate on the annual report of ISC the outgoing chairman, Tom King, remarked of the committee: 'We have developed our role and our operating practices, which are not set out in legislation' (emphasis added).

The influence of intelligence services on the British left:Kenya Scenario

The influence of intelligence services
on the British left

A talk given by Robin Ramsay to Labour Party branches in late 1996This is an adaptation and massive compression of the pamphlet The Clandestine Caucus written and published by Robin Ramsay in 1996. In that the sources for most of the claims contained in this talk are to be found.

Dirty tricks and covert operations

    In the official theory of British politics the state in general and the intelligence services in particular have no role. This is what I think of as the Disney version of politics; and this is the one that is still largely taught in British universities and regurgitated by the mass media. In the Disney version, the state is neutral. Interests in society align with political parties; and the parties contest elections. The election winners form governments whose policies are then implemented by the state. This was the view, for example, of Ron Hayward, the General Secretary of the Labour Party. In 1974 Hayward was informed by a private security company that the Labour Party's headquarters were bugged. 'Nonsense,' said Hayward. 'We don't have Watergate politics in Britain.' Hayward simply didn't know. In 1974 hardly anybody outside Whitehall did.
    But we do have 'Watergate politics' and have had them since the cold war. By Watergate politics I mean, loosely, dirty tricks and covert operations. (Obviously they did exist to some extent before the war, but I'm concentrating on the post-45 period.) With hindsight, post cold war, it was inevitable that the major working class party of the second most important member of NATO would be of interest to the intelligence services of several countries Britain, the US and the Soviet bloc.
    The first I want to look at is the UK's. In 1948 the psychological warfare organisation, IRD, the Information Research Department, was set up within the Foreign Office. IRD worked abroad trying to combat nationalism in the British Empire, and at home to combat the British left. IRD fed information and propaganda on 'communists' within the labour movement through confidential recipients of its briefings one of whom we now know was the late Vic Feather into the media, and into the Labour Party's policing units, the National Agent's Department and the Organisation Subcommittee. These latter organisations also received information on a local basis from some police Special Branches. Special Branches also surveilled the unions, the wider left and organisations like CND. Also, and rather important in this period, surveillance and data collection by private sector groups such as the Economic League, the Building Employers Federation, was still important. [As the state grew in the 30s, and then with the war and the cold war, the relative significance of the private sector declined.]
    But we also had American activities to contend with. Through the State Department and the Department of Labour, the US ran education programmes and freebie trips for sympathetic Labour movement people. Hundreds, maybe thousands, no-one has yet assembled the data of British trade union officials and MPs that had these freebies. The State Department, via the London embassy, was sending back masses of reports. The idea that this was just the role of the CIA is false. None of these British reports have surfaced but over a 1000 pages of such reports made by the New Zealand US embassy to the State Department on the tiny NZ labour movement have been declassified and show surveillance down to the level of trades councils and union branches. It seems a reasonable assumption that the same attention to detail was being exercised on the strategically far more significant British labour movement.
    There were also US labour attachés based in the London US embassy. One of them, Philip Kaiser, has written a memoir which includes an account of his years in London. He writes: 'the labour attache is expected to develop contacts with key leaders in the trade union movement and to influence their thinking and decisions in directions compatible wth American goals...'
    And not just the unions. Joseph Godson, Kaiser's predecessor as the US labour attaché, got so close to Hugh Gaitskell that in the climactic struggle with the Bevanites, Gaitskell was planning strategy with Godson, running between Godson and the National Executive Committee.
    Under the anticommunism banner a series of domestic antileft groups were, I believe, funded by the CIA in Britain. Let me emphasise believe; for I don't have much concrete evidence. This network begins with Common Cause, which then produced an offshoot, Industrial Research and Information Services, IRIS, in the mid 1950s to work in the unions. Common Cause and IRIS produced information and propaganda against what it called 'communists'; and IRIS set up 'cells' its word in unions to combat the left. The significance of this is impossible to evaluate; the man who was running IRIS for much of this period won't answer my questions and Common Cause claimed, in 1987, to have no records. (The Labour Committee for Transatlantic Understanding in the 1970s and 80s was funded if not run by the CIA. One of its members admitted this to a friend of mine but refused to comment on the record.)
    The third aspect of US political interference has been the promotion of a particular section of the Labour Party the social democrats whose current manifestation is the Blairites. So, I'll begin with New Labour people and then trace their ancestry.

The Blairites

    In the Guardian Martin Kettle wrote in February this year,'the New Labour project has always been defined in an Anglo-American context.' Gordon Brown used to tell interviewers that he spent his holidays in the library at Harvard University. In 1986 Tony Blair went on one of those US-sponsored trips to America that are available for promising MPs and came back a supporter of the nuclear deterent. In 1993 he went to a meeting of the secretive Bilderberg Group, one of the meeting places of the European-American elite. (John Monks, an important Blair ally as head of the TUC, attended this year's ie 1996 Bilderberg Group meeting in Toronto.) David Milliband, Blair's head of policy, did a Masters degree at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Jonathan Powell, Blair's foreign policy advisor, used to work in the British embassy in Washington and is suspected by some of having been the liaison officer between British intelligence and the CIA. (There is as yet no evidence for this view.) Edward Balls, Gordon Brown's economics advisor, studied at Harvard and was about to join the World Bank before he joined Brown. Sue Nye, Gordon Brown's personal assistant, lives with Gavyn Davies, chief economist with the predatory American bankers, Goldman Sachs.
    And then there's Peter Mandelson. Via the United Nations Association, of all obscure vehicles, by the end of his final year at Oxford University, in 1976, Mandelson had become Chair of British Youth Council. The British Youth Council began as the British section of the World Assembly of Youth, which was set up and financed by MI6 and then taken over by the CIA in the 1950s, created to combat the Soviet Union's youth fronts. By Mandelson's time in the mid1970s under a Labour government be it noted the British Youth Council was said to be financed by the Foreign Office, though that may be a euphemism for MI6, the British secret intelligence service.
    In 1977 Mandelson and one Charles Clarke, another familiar name, then head of the British National Union of Students, put together a delegation from the UK to attend the 1978 World Festival of Youth. The World Festival of Youth meetings were great cold war jambourees at which the opposing blocs put forward propaganda at the Third World. Charles Clarke, head of the NUS in 1977, and chosen to fly the flag for Britain in Cuba, became Neil Kinnock's chief gatekeeper.
    Peter Mandelson, we were told in 1995 by Donald McIntyre in the Independent, is 'a pillar of the two bluechip foreign affairs thinktanks, Ditchley Park and Chatham House'.
    The point I'm trying to make here is this; from their early twenties Clarke and Mandelson were already in the Whitehall system, young men on the make; players, albeit minor ones, in the Cold War, Foreign Office game. We might call them premature careerists.
    So: the people round Blair are all linked to the United States or the British foreign policy establishment whose chief aim, since Suez, has been to cuddle up to Uncle Sam. This group's orientation is overseas; this is the territory of the Foreign Office and its think tank satellites like the Royal Institute for International Affairs.
    And here is the source of the tension between socalled Old and New Labour. For who are the Labour Party's traditional constituencies? British domestic manufacturing; and British public sector workers. Old Labour is the domestic economy; New Labour is the overseas British economy. In other words, the multinationals, the City of London, and the Foreign Office which represents their interests.
    New Labour is just the latest manifestation of the social democrat tendency within the Labour Party, which runs with Hugh Gaitskell, through Roy Jenkins and the SDP, which has existed since the Cold War, and should more properly be called the American Tendency.

The American Tendency

    In the postwar era, as part of their attempt to manage the entire noncommunist world, the US, often through the CIA, funded social democrats all over the world. They ran a wide spectrum of anticommunist groups in the youth, student and labour fields. Peter Mandelson's World Assembly of Youth was one. The Americans promoted the development of the Common Market. The CIA funded the European Movement.
    The CIA also ran the anticommunist international trade union movement, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the ICFTU, and its various spinoff groups, such as the trade secretariats. Whether the ICFTU and its network of organisation are still by run the CIA, I don't know. They were in the early 1970s. The TUC helped fund the ICFTU through its affiliation fees. By the mid 1950s nearly a quarter of the TUC's annual budget was going to the ICFTU, a CIA operation.
    The CIA ran the Congress for Cultural Freedom which published magazines all over Europe and Asia and organised big conferences to which the British social democrat leaders were invited, and for whom Anthony Crosland worked. In Britain, through the columns of Encounter magazine, this network promoted the Gaitskellites.
    In other words, much of the international political landscape of the postwar era in Britain consisted of US-funded or directed political projects propaganda or psychological warfare projects they would now be called. And this was on top of the formal military-diplomatic-financial structure of NATO, the IMF, World Bank, Gatt, the UN etc.
    At one level this is banal: in the American-dominated world, to get along you went along with the Americans.
    So, if we freeze things at 1963, just before the death of Hugh Gaitskell, the situation in the Labour Party and union movement was this: it was being surveilled by Special Branches, the US state department, the Foreign Office's IRD and various private organisations like the Economic League. Information and disinformation on the left was being distributed by Common Cause and IRIS both funded in my opinion, by the CIA and by the secret Foreign Office propaganda organisation, IRD, through its network of journalists, union leaders and politicians. Where pertinent, the information was being fed into the Labour Party's organisation via the National Agent's Department and the Organisation Subcommittee. In 1963 our Organisation Subcommittee was chaired by George Brown, one of the CIA's sources in the Party.
    In 1963 the Gaitskellites seemed to have a pretty complete grip on the party; their leaders were being boosted, legitimized and discretely subsidized by the CIA through the Congress for Cultural Freedom; and their trade union allies in the major unions appeared to have everything under control having seen off the left's challenge over unilateralism..
    Unfortunately Hugh Gaitskell died, the Labour right couldn't decide on a single candidate, and the leadership election was won by Harold Wilson, who had never been part of this network; who had spent the cold war travelling to Moscow, not to Washington.

The Wilson era

    The Wilson years have been researched in more detail and we can skim across them even more quickly. MI5, encouraged by a section of the CIA, began ploughing through the PLP and Wilson's entourage looking for Soviet espionage. And found none, incidentally.
    On Gaitskell's death the leadership of the American tendency passed to Roy Jenkins and its focus shifted to the Common Market. Members of the American tendency plotted constantly against Wilson.
    In 1967 The CIA's funding of the National Students Association in America was revealed and, quite quickly the whole network of fronts began to unravel. (This caused some questions to be asked about the British National Union of Students. Its leaders, several of whom emerge in the SDP a decade later, all swore blind they knew nothing of the CIA's role.)
    The revelation of its cold war fronts persuaded the CIA that its future lay in more discrete operations with better cover. Lots of apparently independent think tanks began to appear on the scene Brian Crozier's Institute for the Study of Conflict was a pioneer in this field.
    The old networks continued but with diminishing effect. In the mid-1970s Common Cause funded the Trade Union Centre for Education in Democratic Socialism in London but it did not have the impact of IRIS twenty years earlier; and in the 1980s the same people seem to have been involved in the formation of the group Mainstream, formally headed by Bill Jordan. The activities of this Common Cause, IRIS, Mainstream network were centred round two unions, the engineers and electricians; and this activity came to a kind of appropriate resolution recently when Bill Jordan, of the EEEPTU, the amalgamation of the engineers and electricians, became President of the ICFTU the CIA's labour front of the 1950s and 60s.
    When Labour won the election in February 1974, IRD abandoned its briefings on the domestic left for fear of political embarassment and that role was picked up by Brian Crozier, who had been working with IRD and the CIA, as he tells us in his memoirs, since the 1950s. In the 1970s Crozier created what were essentially private sector versions of IRD's intelligence gathering and clandestine briefings on the British left, and the CIA's covert political actions. He had some input into the Social Democratic Alliance in the mid 1970s, the forerunner of the SDP, briefed Mrs Thatcher, while she was leader of the opposition on the 'communist menace', and began producing IRDtype briefings on the British left British Briefing. British Briefing was published by...... IRIS.
    On top of or below all this, in the 1970s MI5 surveilled the British left; penetrated everything from CND through to INLA; investigated and/or smeared and/or blackmailed dozens of Labour MPs (and Tory and Liberal MPs); and, most importantly, it now seems to me, helped keep the Communist Party of Great Britain going.

The Soviet Union's activities

    Which brings me to the third group interested in this great movement of ours, the political and intelligence services of the Soviet Union.
    This story is rather better known, if only because the mass media has reported it. There was some espionage spies spying on each other; and there was some some propaganda for example the network of Soviet fronts, notably the Friendship Societies and the World Peace Council. All of this has been documented in great detail by the right; but I remain unconvinced that it was of much significance. What real influence has the British Peace Council actually had on, say, CND? Let alone the Labour movement or the Labour Party.
    The important aspect of the Soviet Union's activites in the British left has been the Communist Party of Great Britain the CPGB. And here the story gets complicated. I have read quite a few memoirs and histories of the CPGB and, even with the revelations in the late 1980s, I am still unclear as to the exact relationship between the Soviet Union and the CPGB. What is clear however, is that through the unions and through dialogue with some of the Labour left, the CPGB did have some influence on the Labour Party, in particular in the 1970s. On this the right is correct. How much influence they had opinions vary. But the fact that they had any influence at all is largely down to MI5.
    We now know there really was Moscow gold in the CPGB; sacks of used notes were transferred from the Soviet Embassy to the party. But the point is this: MI5 knew about this as soon as it started. Peter Wright told us so in Spycatcher, several years before messers Falber and Matthews of the CPGB Central Committee at the time confessed. And MI5 chose to let the money continue. At any time after 1957 MI5 could have exposed the Soviet funding of the CPGB. Had they done so in, say, in the wake of the suppression of the Hungarian uprising, in what state would the CPGB have been in the 1960s?
    Even in 1974, with private armies forming in the Home Counties, the British Army doing maneouvres at Heathrow and The Times discussing the conditions for a British military coup even then, when, had you believed the Daily Telegraph, the state itself was under threat from militant unions run by the Communist Party even then MI5 chose not to reveal the Soviet funding of the CPGB.
    The same thing was happening in the United States. The man who collected the dollars from the Soviets for the American Communist Party was an FBI agent. Like MI5, the FBI let the funding continue. In effect MI5 and the FBI ran the American and British communist parties as honeytraps for their labour movements.

Thatcherism

    The alliances of intelligence, military and financial circles which had run the disinformation campaigns against the Labour government in the 1970s helped elect Mrs Thatcher leader of the Tory Party and then as Prime Minister. Mrs T, contrary to popular belief, wasn't very bright, and while professing to want to rebuild the British domestic economy, actually turned the City of London loose, abolished exchange controls, and wrecked the domestic economy. The City and the overseas sector boomed while the domestic economy crumbled. The basic fault line in British society was never more nakedly exposed. The President of the CBI spoke of a 'bare knuckle fight' with the Tory government. (He was forced to resign almost immediately afterwards.)
    The City versus industry conflict was recognised in some sections of the Labour Party, notably by Bryan Gould, and the Labour Party began producing policies to deal with it. But in 1986 Neil Kinnock et al decided to support Britain's membership of the EEC and from that point the game was up. For EEC membership was incompatible with the kinds of nationalist, anti free trade policies being produced by the committee chaired by Bryan Gould. So Gould got dumped and the leadership of the PLP began the process of making itself respectable to the moneylenders. After 1992, John Smith, Gordon Brown and Marjorie Mowlem embarked on the socalled 'Prawn cocktail offensive' eating their way round the City's executive dining rooms, promising not to do anything to restrict their activities. (Mowlem subsequently married a banker.) This climaxed with Labour's support for membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism, which, Bryan Gould reports in his memoir, Gordon Brown sold to the Parliamentary Labour Party as a socialist measure to nobble the speculators!
    The important moves were made by Kinnock and Smith in whose teams Brown and Blair were minor players. Tony Blair is merely putting the gloss on; dumping the remnants of the ideological baggage, emasculating the membership and the unions, prior, I would guess, to instituting state funding of the political parties and the final transformation of the Labour Party into the reliable political face of the European Union, NATO, the global economy and the power of the moneylenders.



    This is an adaptation and massive compression of the pamphlet The Clandestine Caucus

Saturday, 31 May 2014

Mobile Phones: How To Trace A Mobile Number?

How To Trace A Mobile Number?


Are you sick and tired or getting missed calls from an unknown number? Do you tend to get all the information belongs to that ‘very’ number which is not only disturbing but also spooky at time? Don’t worry, now with the help of extensive technological growth all over the world, mobile number trackerbecomes an easy source of solution.

It is a doubtless solution for recognizing the offender. With the help of few ‘quick to do’ steps, one can easily get to the ultimatum. You don’t have to be the son of Homes (excuse the pun) but need to check the first 4 to 5 digits which generally stands for the telecom service providers. But at the same time you need to be an Einstein to know all the service providers which no man on Earth can think of. So you are stuck, the answer is no!! You just need to go for the web engines (Google, Yahoo and Bing) which will search for you in seconds.
The hunt would easily speak about the number along with its location. Many a times it is seen that the number is registered in the name of a company where the offender belongs, gives the address of the buyer or the company name.
Social media searches will also aid you in going for a right guess! This will add some fuel in your mission. But all of a sudden the search finishes when the entire exploring ends in some mere suspicion here you can go website which have the options of mobile location finder.
From these kinds of tacking sites you can easily end up with a good result. In fact here you can trace mobile number location with all the necessary details. When you navigate the pages of these kinds of tracing sites, you may come across various options like mobile location findervehicle number registration searchvehicle location Tracker, land line tracer and many more. By putting the number in the search box you can find the telecom service provider address, signalling and connection. This information can be of great usage. In fact would assist you in detecting the location from where the calls are being made.
But if you want to put a complaint or take some legal steps against some criminal activities then police intervention is very necessary. Still these tracing sites can easily complete your very first step of investigation!
So, best of luck and happy tracing ahead!! Read related articles on vehicle tracking system in India!
The post How To Trace A Mobile Number? appeared first on All India News.


Source: http://www.allindianewssite.com/12967/trace-mobile-number/

Thursday, 29 May 2014

Snowden documents:Classified 2013 Covert Mission Intelligence Reports:Caribbean, Mexico, Kenya,Philippines .


The National Security Agency is secretly intercepting, recording, and archiving the audio of virtually every cell phone conversation Kenya, Caribbean, Mexico,Philippines and other unnamed counties.
According to documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, the surveillance is part of a top-secret system – code-named SOMALGET – that was implemented without the knowledge or consent of the Bahamian government. Instead, the agency appears to have used access legally obtained in cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration to open a backdoor to the country’s cellular telephone network, enabling it to covertly record and store the “full-take audio” of every mobile call made to, from and within the Bahamas – and to replay those calls for up to a month.
SOMALGET is part of a broader NSA program called MYSTIC, which The Intercept has learned is being used to secretly monitor the telecommunications systems of the Bahamas and several other countries, including Mexico, the Philippines, and Kenya. But while MYSTIC scrapes mobile networks for so-called “metadata” – information that reveals the time, source, and destination of calls – SOMALGET is a cutting-edge tool that enables the NSA to vacuum up and store the actual content of every conversation in an entire country.
All told, the NSA is using MYSTIC to gather personal data on mobile calls placed in countries with a combined population of more than 250 million people. And according to classified documents, the agency is seeking funding to export the sweeping surveillance capability elsewhere.
The program raises profound questions about the nature and extent of American surveillance abroad. The U.S. intelligence community routinely justifies its massive spying efforts by citing the threats to national security posed by global terrorism and unpredictable rival nations like Russia and Iran. But the NSA documents indicate that SOMALGET has been deployed in the Bahamas to locate “international narcotics traffickers and special-interest alien smugglers” – traditional law-enforcement concerns, but a far cry from derailing terror plots or intercepting weapons of mass destruction.
“The Bahamas is a stable democracy that shares democratic principles, personal freedoms, and rule of law with the United States,” the State Department concluded in a crime and safety report published last year. “There is little to no threat facing Americans from domestic (Bahamian) terrorism, war, or civil unrest.”
By targeting the Bahamas’ entire mobile network, the NSA is intentionally collecting and retaining intelligence on millions of people who have not been accused of any crime or terrorist activity. Nearly five million Americans visit the country each year, and many prominent U.S. citizens keep homes there, including Sen. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), Bill Gates, and Oprah Winfrey.
In addition, the program is a serious – and perhaps illegal – abuse of the access to international phone networks that other countries willingly grant the United States for legitimate law-enforcement surveillance. If the NSA is using the Drug Enforcement Administration’s relationship to the Bahamas as a cover for secretly recording the entire country’s mobile phone calls, it could imperil the longstanding tradition of international law enforcement cooperation that the United States enjoys with its allies.
“It’s surprising, the short-sightedness of the government,” says Michael German, a fellow at New York University’s Brennan Center for Justice who spent 16 years as an FBI agent conducting undercover investigations. “That they couldn’t see how exploiting a lawful mechanism to such a degree that you might lose that justifiable access – that’s where the intelligence community is acting in a way that harms its long-term interests, and clearly the long-term national security interests of the United States.”
The NSA refused to comment on the program, but said in a statement that “the implication that NSA’s foreign intelligence collection is arbitrary and unconstrained is false.” The agency also insisted that it follows procedures to “protect the privacy of U.S. persons” whose communications are “incidentally collected.”
Informed about the NSA’s spying, neither the Bahamian prime minister’s office nor the country’s national security minister had any comment. The embassies of Mexico, Kenya, and the Philippines did not respond to phone messages and emails.



Illustration by Josh Begley
In March, The Washington Post revealed that the NSA had developed the capability to record and store an entire nation’s phone traffic for 30 days. The Post reported that the  capacity was a feature of MYSTIC, which it described as a “voice interception program” that is fully operational in one country and proposed for activation in six others. (The Post also referred to NSA documents suggesting that MYSTIC was pulling metadata in some of those countries.) Citing government requests, the paper declined to name any of those countries.
The Intercept has confirmed that as of 2013, the NSA was actively using MYSTIC to gather cell-phone metadata in five countries, and was intercepting voice data in two of them. Documents show that the NSA has been generating intelligence reports from MYSTIC surveillance in the Bahamas, Mexico, Kenya, the Philippines, and one other country, which The Intercept is not naming in response to specific, credible concerns that doing so could lead to increased violence. The more expansive full-take recording capability has been deployed in both the Bahamas and the unnamed country.
MYSTIC was established in 2009 by the NSA’s Special Source Operations division, which works with corporate partners to conduct surveillance. Documents in the Snowden archive describe it as a “program for embedded collection systems overtly installed on target networks, predominantly for the collection and processing of wireless/mobile communications networks.”

A top-secret description of the MYSTIC program written by the NSA’s Special Source Operations division
If an entire nation’s cell-phone calls were a menu of TV shows, MYSTIC would be a cable programming guide showing which channels offer which shows, and when. SOMALGET would be the DVR that automatically records every show on every channel and stores them for a month. MYSTIC provides the access; SOMALGET provides the massive amounts of storage needed to archive all those calls so that analysts can listen to them at will after the fact. According to one NSA document, SOMALGET is “deployed against entire networks” in the Bahamas and the second country, and processes “over 100 million call events per day.”
SOMALGET’s capabilities are further detailed in a May 2012 memo written by an official in the NSA’s International Crime and Narcotics division. The memo hails the “great success” the NSA’s drugs and crime unit has enjoyed through its use of the program, and boasts about how “beneficial” the collection and recording of every phone call in a given nation can be to intelligence analysts.
Rather than simply making “tentative analytic conclusions derived from metadata,” the memo notes, analysts can follow up on hunches by going back in time and listening to phone calls recorded during the previous month. Such “retrospective retrieval” means that analysts can figure out what targets were saying even when the calls occurred before the targets were identified. “[W]e buffer certain calls that MAY be of foreign intelligence value for a sufficient period to permit a well-informed decision on whether to retrieve and return specific audio content,” the NSA official reported.
“There is little reason,” the official added, that SOMALGET could not be expanded to more countries, as long as the agency provided adequate engineering, coordination and hardware. There is no indication in the documents that the NSA followed up on the official’s enthusiasm.

A 2012 memo written by the NSA’s International Crime & Narcotics division
The documents don’t spell out how the NSA has been able to tap the phone calls of an entire country. But one memo indicates that SOMALGET data is covertly acquired under the auspices of “lawful intercepts” made through Drug Enforcement Administration “accesses”– legal wiretaps of foreign phone networks that the DEA requests as part of international law enforcement cooperation.
When U.S. drug agents need to tap a phone of a suspected drug kingpin in another country, they call up their counterparts and ask them set up an intercept. To facilitate those taps, many nations – including the Bahamas – have hired contractors who install and maintain so-called lawful intercept equipment on their telecommunications. With SOMALGET, it appears that the NSA has used the access those contractors developed to secretly mine the country’s entire phone system for “signals intelligence” –recording every mobile call in the country. “Host countries,” the document notes, “are not aware of NSA’s SIGINT collection.”
“Lawful intercept systems engineer communications vulnerabilities into networks, forcing the carriers to weaken,” says Christopher Soghoian, the principal technologist for the American Civil Liberties Union. “Host governments really should be thinking twice before they accept one of these Trojan horses.”
The DEA has long been in a unique position to help the NSA gain backdoor access to foreign phone networks. “DEA has close relationships with foreign government counterparts and vetted foreign partners,” the manager of the NSA’s drug-war efforts reported in a 2004 memo. Indeed, with more than 80 international offices, the DEA is one of the most widely deployed U.S. agencies around the globe.
But what many foreign governments fail to realize is that U.S. drug agents don’t confine themselves to simply fighting narcotics traffickers. “DEA is actually one of the biggest spy operations there is,” says Finn Selander, a former DEA special agent who works with the drug-reform advocacy group Law Enforcement Against Prohibition. “Our mandate is not just drugs. We collect intelligence.”
What’s more, Selander adds, the NSA has aided the DEA for years on surveillance operations. “On our reports, there’s drug information and then there’s non-drug information,” he says. “So countries let us in because they don’t view us, really, as a spy organization.”
Selander’s first-hand experience is echoed in the 2004 memo by the manager of the NSA’s drug-war efforts, which was titled “DEA: The Other Warfighter.” The DEA and the NSA “enjoy a vibrant two-way information-sharing relationship,” the memo observes, and cooperate so closely on counternarcotics and counterterrorism that there is a risk of “blurring the lines between the two missions.”
Still, the ability to record and replay the phone calls of an entire country appears to be a relatively new weapon in the NSA’s arsenal. None of the half-dozen former U.S. law enforcement officials interviewed by The Intercept said they had ever heard of a surveillance operation quite like the NSA’s Bahamas collection.
“I’m completely unfamiliar with the program,” says Joel Margolis, a former DEA official who is now executive vice president of government affairs for Subsentio, a Colorado-based company that installs lawful intercepts for telecommunications providers. “I used to work in DEA’s office of chief counsel, and I was their lead specialist on lawful surveillance matters. I wasn’t aware of anything like this.”

A 2012 memo written by the NSA’s International Crime & Narcotics division
For nearly two decades, telecom providers in the United States have been legally obligated under the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act to build their networks with wiretapping capabilities, providing law enforcement agencies with access to more efficient, centrally managed surveillance.
Since CALEA’s passage, many countries have adopted similar measures, making it easier to gather telecommunications intelligence for international investigations. A 2001 working group for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime went so far as to urge countries to consider permitting foreign law enforcement agencies to initiate international wiretaps directly from within their own territories.
The process for setting up lawful intercepts in foreign countries is largely the same as in the United States. “Law enforcement issues a warrant or other authorization, a carrier or a carrier’s agent responds to the warrant by provisioning the intercept, and the information is sent in sort of a one-way path to the law enforcement agency,” says Marcus Thomas, a former FBI assistant director who now serves as chief technology officer for Subsentio.
When U.S. drug agents wiretap a country’s phone networks, they must comply with the host country’s laws and work alongside their law enforcement counterparts. “The way DEA works with our allies – it could be Bahamas or Jamaica or anywhere – the host country has to invite us,” says Margolis. “We come in and provide the support, but they do the intercept themselves.”
The Bahamas’ Listening Devices Act requires all wiretaps to be authorized in writing either by the minister of national security or the police commissioner in consultation with the attorney general. The individuals to be targeted must be named. Under the nation’s Data Protection Act, personal data may only be “collected by means which are both lawful and fair in the circumstances of the case.” The office of the Bahamian data protection commissioner, which administers the act, said in a statement that it “was not aware of the matter you raise.”
Countries like the Bahamas don’t install lawful intercepts on their own. With the adoption of international standards, a thriving market has emerged for private firms that are contracted by foreign governments to install and maintain lawful intercept equipment. Currently valued at more than $128 million, the global market for private interception services is expected to skyrocket to more than $970 million within the next four years, according to a 2013 report from the research firm Markets and Markets.
“Most telecom hardware vendors will have some solutions for legal interception,” says a former mobile telecommunications engineer who asked not to be named because he is currently working for the British government. “That’s pretty much because legal interception is a requirement if you’re going to operate a mobile phone network.”
The proliferation of private contractors has apparently provided the NSA with direct access to foreign phone networks. According to the documents, MYSTIC draws its data from “collection systems” that were overtly installed on the telecommunications systems of targeted countries, apparently by corporate “partners” cooperating with the NSA.
One NSA document spells out that “the overt purpose” given for accessing foreign telecommunications systems is “for legitimate commercial service for the Telco’s themselves.” But the same document adds: “Our covert mission is the provision of SIGINT,” or signals intelligence.
The classified 2013 intelligence budget also describes MYSTIC as using “partner-enabled” access to both cellular and landline phone networks. The goal of the access, the budget says, is to “provide comprehensive metadata access and content against targeted communications” in the Caribbean, Mexico, Kenya, the Philippines, and the unnamed country. The budget adds that in the Bahamas, Mexico, and the Philippines, MYSTIC requires “contracted services” for its “operational sustainment.”

Definitions of terms related to the MYSTIC program, drawn from an NSA glossary
The NSA documents don’t specify who is providing access in the Bahamas. But they do describe SOMALGET as an “umbrella term” for systems provided by a private firm, which is described elsewhere in the documents as a “MYSTIC access provider.” (The documents don’t name the firm, but rather refer to a cover name that The Intercept has agreed not to publish in response to a specific, credible concern that doing so could lead to violence.) Communications experts consulted by The Intercept say the descriptions in the documents suggest a company able to install lawful intercept equipment on phone networks.
Though it is not the “access provider,” the behemoth NSA contractor General Dynamics is directly involved in both MYSTIC and SOMALGET. According to documents, the firm has an eight-year, $51 million contract to process “all MYSTIC data and data for other NSA accesses” at a facility in  Annapolis Junction, Maryland, down the road from NSA’s  headquarters. NSA logs of SOMALGET collection activity – communications between analysts about issues such as outages and performance problems – contain references to a technician at a “SOMALGET processing facility” who bears the same name as a LinkedIn user listing General Dynamics as his employer. Reached for comment, a General Dynamics spokesperson referred questions to the NSA.
According to the NSA documents, MYSTIC targets calls and other data transmitted on  Global System for Mobile Communications networks – the primary framework used for cell phone calls worldwide. In the Philippines, MYSTIC collects “GSM, Short Message Service (SMS) and Call Detail Records” via access provided by a “DSD asset in a Philippine provider site.” (The DSD refers to the Defence Signals Directorate, an arm of Australian intelligence. The Australian consulate in New York declined to comment.) The operation in Kenya is “sponsored” by the CIA, according to the documents, and collects “GSM metadata with the potential for content at a later date.” The Mexican operation is likewise sponsored by the CIA. The documents don’t say how or under what pretenses the agency is gathering call data in those countries.
In the Bahamas, the documents say, the NSA intercepts GSM data that is transmitted over what is known as the “A link”–or “A interface”–a core component of many mobile networks. The A link transfers data between two crucial parts of GSM networks – the base station subsystem, where phones in the field communicate with cell towers, and the network subsystem, which routes calls and text messages to the appropriate destination. “It’s where all of the telephone traffic goes,” says the former engineer.
Punching into this portion of a county’s mobile network would give the NSA access to a virtually non-stop stream of communications. It would also require powerful technology.
“I seriously don’t think that would be your run-of-the-mill legal interception equipment,” says the former engineer, who worked with hardware and software that typically maxed out at 1,000 intercepts. The NSA, by contrast, is recording and storing tens of millions of calls – “mass surveillance,” he observes, that goes far beyond the standard practices for lawful interception recognized around the world.
The Bahamas Telecommunications Company did not respond to repeated phone calls and emails.
If the U.S. government wanted to make a case for surveillance in the Bahamas, it could point to the country’s status as a leading haven for tax cheats, corporate shell games, and a wide array of black-market traffickers. The State Department considers the Bahamas both a “major drug-transit country” and a “major money laundering country” (a designation it shares with more than 60 other nations, including the U.S.). According to the International Monetary Fund, as of 2011 the Bahamas was home to 271 banks and trust companies with active licenses. At the time, the Bahamian banks held $595 billion in U.S. assets.
But the NSA documents don’t reflect a concerted focus on the money launderers and powerful financial institutions – including numerous Western banks – that underpin the black market for narcotics in the Bahamas. Instead, an internal NSA presentation from 2013 recounts with pride how analysts used SOMALGET to locate an individual who “arranged Mexico-to-United States marijuana shipments” through the U.S. Postal Service.
A slide from a 2013 NSA Special Source Operations presentation
The presentation doesn’t say whether the NSA shared the information with the DEA. But the drug agency’s Special Operations Divison has come under fire for improperly using classified information obtained by the NSA to launch criminal investigations – and then creating false narratives to mislead courts about how the investigations began. The tactic – known as parallel construction – was first reported by Reuters last year, and is now under investigation by the Justice Department’s inspector general.
So: Beyond a desire to bust island pot dealers, why would the NSA choose to apply a powerful collection tool such as SOMALGET against the Bahamas, which poses virtually no threat to the United States?
The answer may lie in a document that characterizes the Bahamas operation as a “test bed for system deployments, capabilities, and improvements” to SOMALGET. The country’s small population – fewer than 400,000 residents – provides a manageable sample to try out the surveillance system’s features. Since SOMALGET is also operational in one other country, the Bahamas may be used as a sort of guinea pig to beta-test improvements and alterations without impacting the system’s operations elsewhere.
“From an engineering point of view it makes perfect sense,” says the former engineer. “Absolutely.”
Beyond the Bahamas, the other countries being targeted by MYSTIC are more in line with the NSA’s more commonly touted priorities. In Kenya, the U.S. works closely with local security forces in combating the militant fundamentalist group Al-Shabab, based in neighboring Somalia. In the Philippines, the U.S. continues to support a bloody shadow war against Islamist extremists launched by the Bush administration in 2002. Last month, President Barack Obama visited Manila to sign a military pact guaranteeing that U.S. operations in Southeast Asia will continue and expand for at least another decade.
Mexico, another country targeted by MYSTIC, has received billions of dollars in police, military, and intelligence aid from the U.S. government over the past seven years to fight the war on drugs, a conflict that has left more than 70,000 Mexicans dead by some estimates. Attorney General Eric Holder has described Mexican drug cartels as a U.S. “national security threat,” and in 2009, then-CIA director Michael Hayden said the violence and chaos in Mexico would soon be the second greatest security threat facing the U.S. behind Al Qaeda. 

Photo credit: Marcelo A. Salinas/MCT/Zumapress.com
The legality of the NSA’s sweeping surveillance in the Bahamas is unclear, given the permissive laws under which the U.S intelligence community operates. Earlier this year, President Obama issued a policy directive imposing “new limits” on the U.S. intelligence community’s use of “signals intelligence collected in bulk.” In addition to threats against military or allied personnel, the directive lists five broad conditions under which the agency would be permitted to trawl for data in unrestricted dragnets: threats posed by foreign powers, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, cybersecurity, and “transnational criminal threats, including illicit finance and sanctions evasion.”
SOMALGET operates under Executive Order 12333, a Reagan-era rule establishing wide latitude for the NSA and other intelligence agencies to spy on other countries, as long as the attorney general is convinced the efforts are aimed at gathering foreign intelligence. In 2000, theNSA assured Congress that all electronic surveillance performed under 12333 “must be conducted in a manner that minimizes the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of information about unconsenting U.S. persons.” In reality, many legal experts point out, the lack of judicial oversight or criminal penalties for violating the order render the guidelines meaningless.
“I think it would be open, whether it was legal or not,” says German, the former FBI agent. “Because we don’t have all the facts about how they’re doing it. For a long time, the NSA has been interpreting their authority in the broadest possible way, even beyond what an objective observer would say was reasonable.”
“An American citizen has Fourth Amendment rights wherever they are,” adds Kurt Opsahl, an attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation. “Nevertheless, there have certainly been a number of things published over the last year which suggest that there are broad, sweeping programs that the NSA and other government agencies are doing abroad that sweep up the communications of Americans.”
Legal or not, the NSA’s covert surveillance of an entire nation suggests that it will take more than the president’s tepid “limits” to rein in the ambitions of the intelligence community. “It’s almost like they have this mentality – if we can, we will,” says German. “There’s no analysis of the long-term risks of doing it, no analysis of whether it’s actually worth the effort, no analysis of whether we couldn’t take those resources and actually put them on real threats and do more good.”

It’s not surprising, German adds, that the government’s covert program in the Bahamas didn’t remain covert. “The undermining of international law and international cooperation is such a long-term negative result of these programs that they had to know would eventually be exposed, whether through a leak, whether through a spy, whether through an accident,” he says. “Nothing stays secret forever. It really shows the arrogance of these agencies – they were just going to do what they were going to do, and they weren’t really going to consider any other important aspects of how our long-term security needs to be addressed.”